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Justice Sandra Day O'Connor surprised many when she found compelling a 
vision of racial diversity if it is integrationist, forward-looking, optimistic, 
democracy-reinforcing, and non-remedial. Her opinion in Grutter v . Bollinger 
had transformative potential both for affirmative action law and for society in 
general. In Grutter, Justice O 'Connor applied a deferential form of strict 
scrutiny review to the government's use of racial preferences that further the 
"common good. " This innovation immediately raised the following question: 
could the diversity rationale articulated in Grutter (and the concomitant 
relaxed application of strict scrutiny review) be applied to other contexts 
where the Court had traditionally been more skeptical of the use of racial 
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preferences? If so, Grutter was, at the very least, in tension with two pillars of 
affirmative action doctrine: Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co. and Adarand 
Constructors, Inc. v. Pena. And some lower federal courts did interpret Grutter 
broadly, which allowed those courts to sustain the government's use of racial 
preferences where the application of a less deferential form of review would 
likely have led to their invalidation. This moment of expansive and unfettered 
possibility did not last. Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle 
School District No. I stifled Grutter 's expansive potential. Grutter 's potential 
was not entirely destroyed, however, because Justice Kennedy's concurring 
opinion moderated Parents Involved in important respects. Because of Justice 
Kennedy, Grutter 's transformative potential - obscured but not extinguished -
now waits for a more sympathetic Court to recognize it. 
INTRODUCTION 
Grutter v. Bollinger1 had the potential to dramatically transform affirmative 
action doctrine because of the nature of the compelling interest it recognized, 
and the deference with which the Court applied "strict scrutiny" review. In 
Grutter, the Supreme Court ruled that the University of Michigan Law School 
had a compelling interest in "attaining a diverse student body."2 In actuality, 
however, the interest the Grutter Court found compelling was much broader 
than "student body diversity." At the core of the Grutter opinion, the interest 
the Court found compelling was the significant social benefits associated with 
racial diversity, which included: increased cross-racial understanding, better 
preparation for democratic citizenship, enhanced productivity of strategic 
sectors of the American economy and the military, and a more representative 
and legitimate democratic leadership class.3 
While the Grutter Court articulated these social benefits in the context of 
higher education, they are not "educational" benefits per se. The benefits the 
court specified are largely consumed: l) after the educational experience has 
ended, 2) in situations external to the educational context, and 3) by many 
others entirely outside of the educational experience. The educational 
experience, however, provides the means by which the benefits are dispersed. 
Thus, the compelling governmental interest animating Grutter is racial 
diversity when provided in an environment that enhances and disperses the 
social benefits that accompany it. In other words, the central feature of 
Grutter's compelling governmental interest analysis is its recognition that 
racial diversity enhances the "common good" - that is, the "social systems, 
institutions, and environments on which we all depend . . . in a manner that 
1 539 U.S. 306 (2003). 
2 Id. at 328. 
3 Id. (stating that expert reports show that diversity promotes learning and better prepares 
students for work and for society, and that the military and many businesses stress the 
importance of exposure to diversity). 
2008] STIFLING THE POTENTIAL OF GRUTTER V. BOLLINGER 939 
benefits all people."4 
At the same time, the Grutter Court applied a deferential brand of "strict 
scrutiny" review, deferring to the Law School both with respect to the 
importance of racial diversity to its educational mission and to the method the 
Law School used to achieve a more racially diverse class.5 The Grutter 
Court's deferential application of strict scrutiny review clearly affected the 
outcome. The more deferential courts are in applying strict scrutiny, the 
greater the likelihood they will uphold the government's use of racial 
classifications. In contrast to Grutter, Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co. 6 and 
Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena7 counsel that, where government uses race 
to "remedy" intentional discrimination, courts should apply a robust form of 
strict scrutiny review.8 This form of "strict" strict scrutiny usually results in 
the invalidation of the government's affirmative action program. The 
combination of the breadth of Grutter's "common good" compelling interest 
analysis and the Court's deferential approach to the application of strict 
scrutiny review raised a startling possibility: courts might apply a deferential 
form of strict scrutiny review to any affirmative action program that provides 
the social benefits associated with racial diversity. 
Prior to Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District 
No. 1,9 there was a strong argument that Grutter's innovations could be 
extrapolated to the government's use of race in public primary and secondary 
education, public employment, and perhaps even public contracting. Indeed, 
several lower federal courts interpreted Grutter as permitting the government 
to use racial preferences where a less deferential form of review would likely 
have led to their invalidation. 10 For instance, in Comfort v. Lynn School 
Committee11 the First Circuit explicitly relied on the analytic framework set 
forth in Grutter and Gratz v. Bollinger12 to uphold a public school district's 
race-conscious voluntary desegregation plan. Grutter thus had the potential to 
change constitutional outcomes in affirmative action cases outside of the 
higher education context. 
Unfortunately, Grutter's moment of expansive and unfettered possibility did 
not last. In June 2006, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in Parents 
Involved, 13 the case raising virtually the same factual and constitutional 
4 Claire Andre & Manuel Velasquez, The Common Good, 5 ISSUES IN ETHICS 2, 2 (1992). 
5 See irifra Part I.A. 
6 488 U.S. 469 (1989). 
7 515U.S. 200(1995). 
8 See irifra Parts I.A-B. 
9 127 S. Ct. 2738 (2007). 
10 See infra Parts II.A-C. 
11 418 F.3d 1, 5-6 (1st Cir. 2005) (en bane), cert. denied, 546 U.S. 1061 (2005). 
12 539 U.S. 244 (2003). 
13 Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. I, 547 U.S. 1177 (2006) 
(granting certiorari). 
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questions as Comfort, which had been denied certiorari just seven months 
prior. 14 In the interim, Justice O'Connor retired and was replaced by Samuel 
Alito. 15 Grutter's author was gone, and her successor did not display 
enthusiasm for a broad reading of the Grutter precedent. The decision in 
Parents Involved reminds us that constitutional meaning is whatever five 
Justices on the Court say it is. 
Parents Involved curtailed many of Grutter's expansive possibilities. In 
Parents Involved, the Supreme Court ruled that two public school districts' 
race-based voluntary desegregation plans violated the Equal Protection Clause 
because they were insufficiently narrowly tailored to pass strict scrutiny 
review. 16 In reaching this conclusion, a majority of the Court ruled that the 
"present cases are not governed by Grutter" 17 even though the factual contexts 
- higher education and primary and secondary public education - were similar. 
The majority characterized Grutter's compelling interest in the narrowest 
possible terms, emphasizing the importance of individualized determinations in 
the selection mechanism over any discussion of the importance of racial 
diversity to the educational process. 18 Moreover, the Parents Involved 
majority also applied a robust form of strict scrutiny review to the two school 
districts' student assignment plans, in contrast to Grutter's deferential 
approach to the Law School's race-based admissions policy. 19 A plurality of 
the Parents Involved Court argued that it was inappropriate to take the 
government's purpose for the racial classification into consideration at all on 
the strict scrutiny analysis.20 Yet, one interpretation of Grutter is that it 
privileged one particular governmental interest: racial diversity in settings 
likely to promote positive social externalities. The plurality rejected this 
"common good" interpretation of Grutter altogether. The majority and the 
plurality, taken together, left little room for an expansive interpretation of 
Grutter. 
At the other end of the spectrum, Justice Breyer in dissent argued that racial 
classifications should be evaluated in the context in which the classification is 
used.21 For Justice Breyer, Grutter was parallel to Parents Involved even 
though the contexts were different: "the existence of a compelling interest in 
these cases 'follows a fortiori' from Grutter."22 Justice Breyer also recognized 
14 Comfort v. Lynn Sch. Comm., 546 U.S. 1061, 1061 (2005) (denying certiorari). 
15 Bill Mears, Alito Sworn in as Nation's 110th Supreme Court Justice, CNN.COM, Feb. 
4, 2006, http://www.cnn.com/2006/POLITICS/01/31 /alito/index.html. 
16 Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. I, 127 S. Ct. 2738, 2760 
(2007). 
17 Id. at 2754. 
18 See infra Part III.A. 
19 See infra Part III.A. 
20 Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. at 2764 (Roberts, C.J., plurality opinion). 
21 Id. at 2820 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
22 Id. at 2763 (Roberts, C.J., plurality opinion) (describing Justice Breyer's dissenting 
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that Grutter's key contribution was that it allowed courts to focus on the 
distinction between "exclusive and inclusive" uses of race when evaluating the 
constitutionality of affirmative action plans.23 Applying Grutter, Justice 
Breyer opined that the school districts' use of racial classifications "do[ es] not 
impose burdens unfairly upon members of one race alone but instead seek 
benefits for members of all races alike."24 Consequently, Justice Breyer 
implicitly recognized Grutter' s "common good" approach. Justice Breyer's 
dissent suggests that Grutter could be applied outside of the higher education 
context. 
Absent a dramatic turnover of members on the Court, any chance of an 
expansive interpretation of Grutter now lies with Justice Kennedy. However, 
there is reason to believe that Justice Kennedy will not interpret Grutter 
broadly. In Parents Involved, Justice Kennedy joined the majority's opinion 
and provided the critical fifth vote for the Court's holding that the voluntary 
desegregation plans were unconstitutional on narrow tailoring grounds.25 Also, 
in his concurrence, Justice Kennedy disagreed sharply with Justice Breyer's 
dissent, which argued that Grutter's key contribution was that it allowed courts 
to focus on the distinction between "exclusive and inclusive" uses of race in 
evaluating the constitutionality of an affirmative action plan.26 Justice 
Kennedy explicitly took Justice Breyer to task for his interpretation of Grutter 
because it "would result in the broad acceptance of governmental racial 
classifications in areas far afield from schooling."27 Thus, much of Justice 
Kennedy's concurrence appears to reject Grutter's "common good" approach. 
Assuming the Court retains its current configuration, the broadest possible 
reading of Grutter is off the table; Parents Involved clearly stifles Grutter's 
potential. 
But it would be a mistake to read Parents Involved too broadly. While 
Parents Involved stifles Grutter's potential, it does not destroy it - largely 
because of Justice Kennedy's concurrence. Grutter clearly played a role in 
Justice Kennedy's compelling interest analysis in that it "informed" his 
conclusion that diversity, "depending on its meaning and definition, is a 
compelling educational goal a school district may pursue."28 Indeed, there are 
currently five votes on the Court for this proposition.29 Consequently, Justice 
Kennedy rejected the view that Grutter has no relevance whatsoever outside 
opinion). 
23 Id. at 2817 (Breyer, J., dissenting) . 
24 Id. at 2818. 
25 Id. at 2753-54, 2760 (majority opinion). 
26 See infra Part III.C. 
27 Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. at 2793 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in 
the judgment). 
28 Id. at 2789. 
29 The three justices joining Justice Breyer' s dissenting opinion clearly agreed with this 
statement. Id. at 2820-24 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
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the higher education context. Because Justice Kennedy's concurrence is 
unclear as to exactly how much of a role Grutter played in his analysis, it is 
difficult to assess Grutter' s ongoing vitality. Nevertheless, Grutter was a 
factor in Justice Kennedy's analysis, a strong argument that Grutter's 
expansive possibilities remain intact. Thanks to Justice Kennedy, Parents 
Involved neither overturned Grutter nor limited it to its facts. Grutter's 
expansive possibilities - stifled but not destroyed by Parents Involved - now 
await a more sympathetic Court to rediscover them. This Article explores 
those obscured possibilities. 
In Part I of this Article, I explain how Grutter v. Bollinger changed the 
landscape of affirmative action law. First, it clarified that the Court would 
accept a nonremedial justification for the use of racial classifications, creating 
greater constitutional leeway for affirmative action programs. Second, it 
applied a deferential brand of "strict scrutiny" review to the University of 
Michigan Law School 's race-based admissions program. Finally, Grutter 
solidified and ultimately expanded the educational diversity rationale inherited 
from Justice Powell's opinion in Regents of the University of California v. 
Bakke.30 The interest the Grutter Court found compelling was that racial 
diversity promotes the "common good." Other governmental actors are 
equally well-positioned to inculcate and disperse the social benefits associated 
with racial diversity. Consequently, after Grutter, there was a strong argument 
that courts could apply a deferential brand of strict scrutiny review to 
affirmative action programs outside of the higher education context. 
In Part II, I explore the possibility of Grutter' s application outside of higher 
education in three contexts: voluntary public primary and secondary school 
desegregation programs, public employment, and finally, "minority set-asides" 
in government contracting programs. I show how courts in each of these 
contexts relied on Grutter to support their analyses that the government's use 
of racial preferences did not violate the Equal Protection Clause. In these 
cases, Grutter did real work in providing an additional compelling interest 
upon which the government could rely to justify its use of racial preferences; 
taking certain evidentiary issues off the table; allowing courts to defer to the 
government's educational choices; and allowing courts to rely on the 
government's "good faith" in assessing elements of the narrow tailoring 
analysis. These cases demonstrate that Grutter had the potential to change 
both constitutional analyses and constitutional outcomes outside of the higher 
education context. 
Finally, in Part III I explain how Parents Involved stifles Grutter v. 
Bollinger's expansive potential. I explain how the majority attempted to 
narrow Grutter to the higher education context alone, and how the plurality 
rejected the "common good" interpretation of Grutter. At the same time, I 
30 Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 311 (1978) (opinion of Powell, J.) 
(holding that the attainment of a diverse student body was the only interest asserted by the 
university that survived scrutiny). 
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demonstrate how Justice Kennedy's concurrence is critical to understanding 
both Parents Involved and Grutter. Justice Kennedy moderated the impact of 
the majority and the plurality's cramped interpretation of Grutter, saving 
Grutter from being overruled. But while it is true that Justice Kennedy's 
concurrence saves Grutter from irrelevance and keeps its expansive 
possibilities "in play," there is also a strong argument that it narrows rather 
than expands Grutter's possibilities, at least in the short term. Justice 
Kennedy's concurrence applied a robust rather than a deferential style of strict 
scrutiny review to the school districts ' voluntary desegregation plans and 
rejected much of Justice Breyer's dissent, which offered an expansive 
interpretation of Grutter. In addition, while Justice Kennedy described the 
school districts' compelling interest broadly, it is unclear whether Justice 
Kennedy's concurrence actually assists school districts in avoiding racial 
isolation. 
Consequently, we are left with a confounding reality: Parents Involved 
stifles, but does not destroy, Grutter's potential for future Courts, with any 
hope of an expansive interpretation of Grutter residing with Justice Kennedy. 
Justice Kennedy's Parents Involved concurrence demonstrates both an 
openness to racial diversity as an ideal and an abhorrence of "[g]ovemmental 
classifications that command people to march in different directions based on 
racial typologies."31 In order to reach Justice Kennedy, any argument that 
attempts to take Grutter beyond higher education would need to demonstrate 
the government' s superior ability to inculcate and disperse the social benefits 
associated with racial diversity, but in a manner that does not classify 
individuals on the basis of race. The open question going forward is whether 
governmental entities, outside of colleges and universities, can effectively 
make this claim. 
I. GR UTTER V. BOLLINGER: SOME ANSWERS AND SOME POSSIBILITIES 
Grutter v. Bollinger altered the landscape of affirmative action law in at 
least three ways. First, Grutter showed that the Court would accept a 
nonremedial rationale for the use of racial classifications. Second, in 
upholding the constitutionality of the University of Michigan Law School's 
race-based admissions program, the Grutter Court applied a deferential brand 
of strict scrutiny review, deferring to the Law School on both prongs of the 
strict scrutiny analysis. This deferential brand of review is in stark contrast to 
the robust brand of strict scrutiny review the Court applies to the government's 
use of race to remedy intentional discrimination, suggesting a clear hierarchy 
between the two justifications for affirmative action plans. Finally, Grutter 
solidified and ultimately expanded the educational diversity rationale inherited 
from Justice Powell's opinion in Regents of the University of California v. 
31 Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. at 2797 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in 
the judgment). 
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Bakke.32 
A. The Triumph of the "Nonremedial" Justification and the Importance of 
Deference 
Under current equal protection doctrine, courts evaluate the government's 
use of racial classifications by applying "strict scrutiny."33 The strict scrutiny 
standard is a two-pronged test, which evaluates both the nature of the interest 
put forward by the government, and the relationship between that rationale and 
the means used to achieve that interest. Under strict scrutiny, . racial 
classifications must first be sufficiently "compelling" to withstand heightened 
judicial review.34 Second, even where racial classifications are deemed 
sufficiently compelling, "the means chosen by the State to effectuate its 
purpose must be 'narrowly tailored to the achievement of that goal. "'35 
Prior to Grutter, it was clear that in evaluating an affirmative action 
program, the Court accepted as "compelling" the government's interest in 
remedying the present effects of past ( or present) intentional discrimination 
(hereinafter, the "remedial" rationale).36 The Court accepted the remedial 
rationale in a wide variety of contexts including public employment,37 public 
contracting,38 and public education.39 In Bakke, the Court also appeared to 
accept the government's interest in obtaining racial diversity in the context of 
higher education as sufficiently compelling to withstand strict scrutiny 
review.40 Justice Powell's opinion in Bakke, which affirmed the importance of 
32 Justice O'Connor's compelling governmental interest analysis, with its varied focus on 
diversity's positive externalities wholly exogenous to the university setting, went far beyond 
Justice Powell's explication of "viewpoint diversity" in Bakke. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 
539 U.S. 306, 330-31 (2003) (highlighting the societal and workplace benefits that accrue 
from educational diversity). 
33 Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200,227 (1995). 
34 See, e.g., Grutter, 539 U.S. at 322. 
35 Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 274 (1986) (citing Fullilove v. 
Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448,480 (1980)). 
36 See, e.g., United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149,167 (1987). 
37 Id. at 185-86. 
38 Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 491-92. 
39 Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 271-72 (1978) (opinion of Powell, 
J.). 
40 The plurality opinion in Bakke is famously inscrutable. Four Justices held that the 
University of California at Davis Medical School's special admissions program did not 
violate equal protection because it met the requirements of intermediate scrutiny. Id. at 369 
(Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part). Four other Justices 
held that the Medical School's special admissions program violated Title VI, and thus did 
not reach the question of whether the program was also a violation of the Equal Protection 
Clause. Id. at 417-21 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part). 
Justice Powell agreed that the special admissions program was illegal, supplying the fifth 
vote for that view. Id. at 320 (opinion of Powell, J.). However, Justice Powell also ruled 
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racial diversity in higher education, was broadly influential.41 But in Adarand 
v. Pena,42 the Court overturned Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC,43 which had 
sustained a diversity-based affirmative action program for federal broadcast 
licenses.44 Adarand suggested the Court would no longer accept the diversity 
rationale as a compelling government interest.45 Thus, one view of Adarand 
was that the diversity rationale simply could not support an affirmative action 
plan at all.46 Indeed, one question was whether a nonremedial rationale could 
ever justify the use of racial preferences.47 
that the goal of achieving a diverse student body is sufficiently compelling to justify the 
consideration of race in admissions, and that the decision below enjoining the Medical 
School "from according any consideration to race in its admissions process must be 
reversed." Id. at 272. Thus, there were five votes for the proposition that Alan Bakke must 
be admitted to the Medical School. There were also five votes for the proposition that race 
could play some role in the admissions process. However, no other Justice joined Justice 
Powell's opinion, which discussed the importance of diversity in higher education and 
elaborated upon what role race could play in the admissions process. Id. at 287-320. 
41 See, e.g., Wessmann v. Gittens, 160 F.3d 790, 794-800 (1st Cir. 1998) (using Justice 
Powell's decision to frame the court's analysis in rejecting the constitutionality of the 
school's program); Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932, 942 (5th Cir. 1996) ("Justice Powell's 
opinion has appeared to represent the 'swing vote,' and though, in significant part, it was 
joined by no other Justice, it has played a prominent role in subsequent debates concerning 
the impact of Bakke."). 
42 515 U.S. 200,202 (1995). 
43 497 U.S. 54 7 (1990). 
44 Id. at 552. 
45 In Adarand, the central issue was what level of judicial scrutiny should apply to the 
use of racial preferences in federal contracting programs. Adarand, 515 U.S. at 224 
(holding that any person, of whatever race, has the right to demand - subject to the most 
strict judicial scrutiny - that a governmental actor subject to the Constitution justify the 
racial classification subjecting that person to unequal treatment). In ruling that strict 
scrutiny ought to apply, the Court overturned Metro Broadcasting to the extent that it 
"adopt[ed] intermediate scrutiny as the standard of review for congressionally mandated 
'benign' racial classifications .... " Id. at 226. Adarand's holding cast doubt on the 
viability of a non-remedial rationale because Metro Broadcasting had applied intermediate 
scrutiny to uphold the use of race to ensure "programming diversity" among FCC broadcast 
licensees. Metro Broad., 497 U.S. at 566. More specifically, Metro Broadcasting ruled that 
"the interest in enhancing broadcast diversity is, at the very least, an important 
governmental objective," similar to the "viewpoint diversity" concept the Court identified as 
central to Justice Powell's opinion in Bakke. Id. at 567-68. Given Adarand's observation 
that Metro Broadcasting had taken a "surprising tum" in relation to the Court's previous 
equal protection doctrine, one possibility was that Metro Broadcasting had been overruled 
in all respects. See Adarand, 515 U.S. at 225. 
46 See, e.g., Hopwood v. Texas, 236 F.3d 256, 274-75 (5th Cir. 2000). 
47 See, e.g., Builders Ass'n of Greater Chicago v. County of Cook, 256 F.3d 642, 644 
(7th Cir. 200 I) ("Whether nonremedial justifications for 'reverse discrimination' by a public 
body are ever possible is unsettled."); Wittmer v. Peters, 87 F.3d 916, 918 (7th Cir. 1996) 
(stating that the question remains open in the Supreme Court as to whether any rationale 
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Grutter resolved that question definitively; after Grutter it was clear that a 
"nonremedial justification for 'reverse discrimination' by a public body [was] 
possible."48 Moreover, in reaching its conclusion, the Court deferred to the 
University of Michigan Law School on both prongs of the strict scrutiny 
analysis. Indeed, the Court's deferential brand of strict scrutiny review 
suggested "a new willingness to rely upon good faith."49 And the Court's 
relaxed brand of strict scrutiny contrasted sharply with its approach to the 
governrnent's remedial use ofracial preferences in an affirmative action plan. 
Grutter concerned the University of Michigan Law School's admissions 
policy, which sought to enroll a " 'critical mass' of underrepresented minority 
students."50 The policy "consider[ed] race or ethnicity ... flexibly as a 'plus' 
factor in the context of individualized consideration of each and every 
applicant."51 The Court applied a relaxed form of strict scrutiny review to the 
Law School's race-based admissions policy. First, the Court deferred to the 
Law School's determination that the goal of "attaining a diverse student body" 
was central to its mission.52 Thus, the Court held that there is a compelling 
interest in obtaining "the educational benefits that flow from a diverse student 
body."53 
The Grutter Court placed no burden on the Law School to show precisely 
why "attaining a diverse student body is at the heart of [its] proper institutional 
mission."54 Nor was the Law School required to demonstrate that the inclusion 
of underrepresented minorities would actually enhance that mission. In the 
context of higher education, deference rather than suspicion is the hallmark of 
strict scrutiny review. This approach is in stark contrast to the Court's 
skeptical approach to the remedial justification, where it vigilantly guards 
against unauthorized attempts to remedy societal discrimination. 
In evaluating the government' s remedial justification for the use of racial 
classifications, the Court applies an aggressive form of strict scrutiny review to 
other than rectifying past discrimination is permissible). On the other hand, Adarand said 
nothing whatsoever about Bakke. Adarand clearly introduced a problem, however, and 
Justice Powell's opinion in Bakke did not command a majority of the Court. See supra note 
40. 
48 Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 338-40 (2003). 
49 Concrete Works of Colo. v. City & County of Denver, 540 U.S. 1027, 1034-35 (2003) 
(Scalia, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari) (citing Grutter, 539 U.S. 306, 343) (arguing 
that racial classifications are inherently "suspect" and require more than good faith 
assurances). 
50 Grutter, 539 U.S. at 306. 
5 1 Id. at 334. 
52 Id. at 328 ("The Law School's educational judgment that such diversity is essential to 
its educational mission is one to which we defer. The Law School' s assessment that 
diversity will , in fact, yield educational benefits is substantiated by respondents and their 
amici."). 
53 Id. at 343. 
54 Id. at 329. 
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ensure that the government's use of racial preferences is directed at an 
appropriate remedial object. An appropriate remedial object is either the 
government's own discrimination or discrimination in the private market to 
which the government is a "passive participant."55 An inappropriate remedial 
object is societal discrimination - discrimination which the government is not 
legally responsible for and therefore cannot remedy using race. Under this 
robust brand of strict scrutiny review, the Court requires the government to 
identify the specific harm it intends to ameliorate, explain how the 
beneficiaries of the program were harmed by particular discriminatory acts, 
and explain the government's role in either creating or perpetuating those 
discriminatory acts.56 Thus, a government actor seeking to justify its use of 
racial preferences as a remedy for discrimination faces substantial obstacles. 
The application of this robust form of strict scrutiny often leads to pro-reverse 
discrimination plaintiff outcomes.57 This aggressive form of strict scrutiny 
review reflects deep-seated judicial skepticism of affirmative action programs 
justified as remedies for intentional discrimination. 
One argument is that the Grutter Court deferred to the Law School because 
of the need to respect the school's "academic autonomy."58 Indeed, the Court 
stated, "[w]e have long recognized that, given the important purpose of public 
education and the expansive freedoms of speech and thought associated with 
the university environment, universities occupy a special niche in our 
constitutional tradition."59 Consequently, one view is that the Court's 
deference to the Law School was mandated by special First Amendment 
concerns associated with universities.60 To the extent that colleges and 
universities are unique "first amendment institutions,"61 Grutter's deferential 
brand of strict scrutiny review may not be transferrable to other settings. 
However, even if we assume that "deference to the Law School's 
educational judgment performed real work in Grutter,"62 it does not 
necessarily follow that public colleges and universities are the only 
government entities to which · deferential strict scrutiny should be applied. 
55 Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469,492 (1989). 
56 Id. at 476-511. 
57 HAROLD LEWIS, JR. & ELIZABETH NORMAN, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW AND 
PRACTICE 384 (2d ed. 2004) (explaining that under the Croson standard, most "equal 
protection challenges to current plans have succeeded"). 
58 See Neal Kumar Katya!, The Promise and Precondition of Educational Autonomy, 31 
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 557, 559 (2003) (defining academic autonomy as the ability of "the 
university itself, to make educational judgments for the sake of its students"). 
59 Grutter, 539 U.S. at 329. 
60 See, e.g., J. Peter Byrne, The Threat to Constitutional Academic Freedom , 3 I J.C. & 
U.L. 79, 116-17 (2004) ("The logic of Justice O 'Connor's opinion for the Court required 
that great weight be placed upon institutional academic freedom to make the case that 
student body racial diversity amounts to a compelling interest."). 
61 Paul Horwitz, Grutter 's First Amendment, 46 B.C. L. REV. 461 , 567 (2005). 
62 Id. at 496. 
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First, to the extent that the Court grounded its compelling interest analysis in 
academic autonomy, this simply suggests that "universities often have superior 
competence at making tough admissions policy choices when compared to 
federal courts."63 But other entities - public employers, public schools and 
more democratically accountable sectors of government - may be just as well 
situated to make determinations regarding affirmative action, which is 
fundamentally a public policy question.64 
Second, as discussed below, the benefits the Court associated with racial 
diversity were not entirely educational in nature, undercutting the argument 
that deference can be accorded only to an institution of higher education. The 
Court's independent judgments with respect to the social goods associated with 
racial diversity undermine the argument that its compelling interest analysis 
hinged on an application of a brand of deference that is solely confined to 
higher education.65 Finally, even granting special First Amendment status to 
colleges and universities, as Paul Horwitz has argued, "Grutter may counsel 
other institutions - religious institutions, media institutions, libraries, perhaps 
professionals, and even other institutions - to seek from the Court the same 
recognition that they have special roles to play in the social firmament and 
ought, perhaps, to be treated according to special rules."66 
B. Promoting the "Common Good ": Racial Diversity as a Compelling 
Governmental Interest 
In Grutter, the Court ruled that the Law School has a "compelling interest in 
attaining a diverse student body."67 In reaching this conclusion, the Court 
adopted an expansive vision of racial diversity through a "common good" 
approach in characterizing the social goods provided by racial diversity. 
"Common good" is defined as those benefits which promote the "social 
systems, institutions, and environments on which we all depend [and] work in 
a manner that benefits all people."68 Along these lines, Grutter conceptualized 
63 Katyal , supra note 58, at 571 . 
64 See Luis Fuentes-Rohwer & Guy-Uriel E. Charles, In Defense of Deference, 21 
CONST. COMMENT. 133, 136 (2004). 
65 As J. Peter Byrne suggests: 
The Court also apparently made an independent judgment that diversity in higher 
education was important. It embraced the views expressed in amicus curiae briefs by 
business leaders and military leaders that diversity is important in business and military 
command as well, and also stressed the general social benefits from the educational 
pathways to power and success being 'visibly open ' to people of all races. 
Byrne, supra note 60, at 117. 
66 Hoiwitz, supra note 61 , at 569. 
67 Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 328 (2003). 
68 Andre & Velasquez, supra note 4, at 2. Of course, this definition may be overly facile ; 
at least one scholar has suggested that the "common good is an attractive idea, but a 
notoriously difficult one." BILL JORDAN, THE COMMON GOOD: CITIZENSHIP, MORALITY AND 
SELF-INTEREST I (I 989). This is particularly true given the concept's long and complicated 
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the benefits associated with diversity very broadly - as benefits accruing to all. 
Rather than "smoking out" illicit motives, strict scrutiny presents the "sole 
question [ of] whether the conceded race-based purpose is constitutionally 
legitimate."69 And that question, the constitutional legitimacy of the racial 
preference, is determined using a balancing test.70 Grutter balancing, however, 
is very nuanced. For instance, Justice O'Connor's compelling interest analysis 
did not suggest that the Law School's admissions process was a "zero-sum" 
game in which white applicants necessarily "lose" when an underrepresented 
minority is accepted. Instead, in conceptualizing the importance of the interest 
asserted by the Law School, the Grutter Court balanced competing public 
benefits. As Bruce Douglass argues: 
In most instances in which the public interest is perceived to conflict with 
the interests of particular individuals, it is not the case ... that we believe 
the conflict is so deep that these individuals have nothing to gain from 
realization of the public interest. Rather, what is involved is a balancing 
of competing benefits, in which such individuals have more to gain, in the 
short term at least, from the realization of their special interest. In tum, 
should they lose, they are not complete losers. The point of 
characterizing a benefit as public is precisely that it does really pertain to 
everyone - if not actually, at least potentially. 71 
The public interest is not simply what the majority would prefer, but rather 
describes "benefits which apply, more or less equally, to all."72 This is the 
"common good," and it is this vision of public benefits that informed Justice 
O'Connor's strict scrutiny analysis in Grutter. 
As Justice O'Connor described the Law School's admissions policy, 
everybody wins, including the frustrated white applicants, as long as the harm 
to those applicants is minimized through appropriate attention to their interests 
throughout the admissions process. I will parse Justice O'Connor's opinion for 
the Court and show that there were three reasons why the Law School's use of 
race outweighed the countervailing interest of white applicants, one 
endogenous to the university setting and two exogenous to it: that diversity 
benefits the educational process; that diversity benefits society more generally; 
and that diversity ensures a more legitimate leadership class in our democratic 
system. 
The first reason that the Law School's use of race was compelling - that 
provenance, and because "any system of voluntary cooperation between self-interested 
individuals and the coordination of their individual interests for the common good is 
vulnerable to the charge of authoritarianism." Kevin P. Quinn, Sandel's Communitarianism 
and Public Deliberations Over Health Care Policy, 85 GEO. L.J. 2161, 2180 (1997). 
69 Jed Rubenfeld, Affirmative Action, l 07 YALE L.J. 427,437 (1997). 
70 Id. at 438. Rubenfeld refers to this test as the "cost-benefit justificatory test." Id. 
71 Bruce Douglass, The Common Good and the Public Interest, 8 POL. THEORY 103, 112 
( 1980). 
72 Id. at 110. 
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diversity benefits the educational process - was endogenous to the university 
setting and echoed the thrust of Justice Powell's opinion in Bakke. The Powell 
vision of educational diversity is synonymous with "viewpoint diversity." 
Thus, in Bakke, Justice Powell explained that the "robust exchange of ideas,"73 
in both the classroom setting and outside of it, was "essential to the quality of 
higher education."74 In Justice Powell's words, "[a] farm boy from Idaho can 
bring something to Harvard College that a Bostonian cannot offer. Similarly, a 
black student can usually bring something that a white person cannot offer. "75 
Echoing this theme, Justice O'Connor explained that diversity enhanced the 
educational experience for all because it promotes "cross-racial 
understanding,"76 which "break[s] down racial stereotypes," and "enables 
students to better understand persons of different races."77 For Justice 
O'Connor, racial diversity enhanced the understanding and appreciation of the 
differences of others, which, in turn, generated clear educational benefits for 
all students, such as more enlightened classroom discussions and a better 
learning experience.78 Indeed, later in the opinion, Justice O'Connor explicitly 
endorsed the "viewpoint diversity" concept which had formed the basis of 
Justice Powell's opinion in Bakke. 79 
Second, the Court also ruled that the Law School's use of race was 
compelling because a racially diverse class benefited society more generally, 
independent of diversity's impact on the educational process. Justice 
O'Connor explained that racial and ethnic diversity in a university setting 
"better prepares students for an increasingly diverse workforce and society, 
and better prepares them as professionals."80 Indeed, Justice O'Connor was 
emphatic on this point, asserting that "[t]hese benefits are not theoretical but 
real,"81 given evidence suggesting that "major American businesses"82 and the 
United States military could not function without employees and soldiers 
trained "through exposure to widely diverse people, cultures, ideas and 
73 Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265,313 (1978) (opinion of Powell, J.) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
14 Id. at 312. 
15 Id. at 316. 
76 Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 308 (2003). 
n Id. 
78 Id. (asserting that "classroom discussion is livelier, more spirited, and simply more 
enlightening and interesting" when the students have "the greatest possible variety of 
backgrounds"). 
19 Id. at 333 ("Just as growing up in a particular region or having particular professional 
experiences is likely to affect an individual ' s views, so too is one's own, unique experience 
of being a racial minority in a society, like our own, in which race unfortunately still 
matters."). 
80 Id. at 330. 
81 Id. 
82 Id. 
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viewpoints."83 Justice O'Connor did not, however, stop there. In accessing 
the downstream benefits created by "cross-racial understanding" within the 
education process, she also explored the relationship among education, work 
and citizenship. Justice O'Connor explained that because education was the 
"foundation of good citizenship,"84 "the diffusion of knowledge and 
opportunity through public institutions of higher education must be accessible 
to all individuals regardless of race or ethnicity."85 
There are two ways to read Justice O'Connor's emphasis on accessibility: 
remedial (focusing on minority beneficiaries of the Law School's policy) and 
external and wide-ranging (focusing on overall societal benefit generated by 
racial integration). With the remedial view, the Court's prime concern was 
that the minority beneficiaries of the admissions policy have access to the 
"knowledge and opportunity"86 afforded by public educational institutions of 
the prestige and rank of the University of Michigan Law School. From this 
perspective, Justice O'Connor is explicitly recognizing that higher education 
generates status and opportunity, and that minority group members who have 
historically been excluded should now have access to it. After all, Justice 
O'Connor explicitly acknowledges that "race unfortunately still matters" in our 
society, suggesting that the Law School's affirmative action plan is necessary 
to redress the continuing harms associated with a segregated and unequal 
society.87 The remedial interpretation would seem to conflict with Croson, 
83 Id. 
84 Id. at 331 (citing Brown v. Bd. ofEduc., 347 U.S. 483,493 (1954)). 
85 Id. (emphasis added). 
s6 Id. 
87 Id. at 333. The strongest argument in support of this proposition is the time limit she 
appears to place on affirmative action plans: "[w]e expect that 25 years from now, the use of 
racial preferences will no longer be necessary to further the interest approved today." Id. at 
343. The twenty-five-year sunset is consistent with a compensatory remedy; time 
limitations suggest a period after which the intended beneficiaries will no longer require the 
particular benefit. See, e.g., Kevin R. Johnson, The Last Twenty Five Years of Affirmative 
Action?, 21 CONST. COMMENT. 171, 173 (2004) ("Remedial-based affirmative action, in 
contrast, would not be necessary after the impacts of an institution 's discrimination had been 
remedied."). Justice O'Connor's time-limiting statement is admittedly paradoxical. See 
Christopher J. Schmidt, Caught in a Paradox: Problems with Grutter 's Expectation That 
Race-Conscious Admissions Programs Will End in Twenty-Five Years, 24 N. ILL. U. L. REv. 
753, 755 (2004). But there are at least two responses to this line of argument, undercutting 
the remedial understanding. First, because the discussion of the time limitation is not 
necessary to the holding, it is dicta and therefore has "inspirational - but not precedential -
effect." See Michael Abramowicz & Maxwell Steams, Defining Dicta, 57 STAN. L. REv. 
953, 1093 (2005) (arguing "there is a strong argument that the no-later-than-2028 restriction 
is not based on the facts of the case and counts as dicta"). Thus, the statement should be 
viewed as a wish or exhortation, rather than as consistent with a compensatory or remedial 
analytical approach. Second, one might view the twenty-five-year "limitation" as 
completely consistent with a forward-looking, non-compensatory, integrationist 
interpretation of Grutter. Imagine, for instance, that two towns are attempting to merge into 
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which ruled that government may not use racial classifications to remedy 
societal discrimination. 88 
On the other hand, Justice O'Connor's recognition of the need for minorities 
to participate in and have access to public educational institutions can be seen 
as serving a more wide-ranging goal. On this view, the inclusion of minorities 
within the Law School was not necessary to compensate for any past race-
based harm that prevented their matriculation in substantial numbers. Their 
inclusion serves instead to undercut the ugly message communicated about our 
society generally by their exclusion from prominent public institutions: that of 
a society still hopelessly rent by racial division, segregation and animosity. 
Justice O'Connor lionizes a particular normative vision of American society 
when she says "[e]ffective participation by members of all racial and ethnic 
groups in the civic life of our Nation is essential if the dream of one Nation, 
indivisible, is to be realized."89 The appearance of inclusion in status-granting 
educational institutions matters because it is indicative of an open, democratic, 
and modem society. 
The third reason why the Law School was justified in using racial 
preferences was also exogenous to the university setting: the "leadership" 
claim. This part of the Court's analysis also turned on the belief that a racially 
diverse class benefits society more generally, similarly independent of 
diversity's impact on the educational process. As in earlier parts of the 
compelling governmental interest analysis, Justice O'Connor recognized that 
higher education functions as a pathway, providing students with the necessary 
tools to participate in the larger society. Here, however, the focus was not on 
students' preparation for employment opportunities in a diverse society, but on 
higher education's role in creating an elite leadership class.90 On this view, 
racial preferences are justified by the need to develop a multi-racial "leadership 
class." She recognized that many leaders of our society have benefited from a 
legal education and that lawyers are disproportionately represented in the halls 
one large metropolitan area. Such a merger would require the restructuring of city 
government and elimination of duplicative functions. But at some point, a new, unified 
town would emerge. So, too, one might view the twenty-five-year period after which 
Justice O'Connor expects that racial preferences would no longer be necessary. On this 
view, the twenty-five-year period represents an (admittedly optimistic) estimation of the 
time it would take for at least certain sectors of our society to integrate successfully. 
88 Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 505-06 (1989). Indeed, at least one 
commentator argued that Grutter allowed governmental actors to remedy societal 
discrimination, essentially overturning the remedial line of affirmative action cases sub 
silentio. See Goodwin Liu, Brown, Bollinger, and Beyond, 47 How. L.J. 705, 759-63 
(2004). 
89 Grutter, 539 U.S. at 332. 
90 Id. ("In order to cultivate a set of leaders with legitimacy in the eyes of the citizenry, it 
is necessary that the path to leadership be visibly open to talented and qualified individuals 
of every race and ethnicity."). 
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ofpower.91 
But was the Law School permitted to use racial preferences because the 
benefits of elite education must now flow to members of a previously excluded 
group, or because a homogeneous leadership class cannot effectively lead a 
modern, multi-racial democracy? The latter demand appeared dominant. 
Justice O'Connor's analysis centered on universal needs and societal demands. 
Along these lines, she suggested that "[a]ll members of our heterogeneous 
society must have confidence in the openness and integrity of the educational 
institutions that provide this training."92 In the end, the societal demand for 
leadership that would be viewed as legitimate precisely because of its multi-
racial makeup seemed to trump the more remedial rationale for the use of 
racial preferences. 
C. Narrow Tailoring: Deference to the Manner and Mode 
The Grutter Court also displayed notable deference to the Law School on 
the "narrow tailoring" portion of the strict scrutiny test. This deference was 
displayed in the Court's evaluation of the mechanics of the Law School's 
admissions plan. For instance, the Court accepted the Law School's argument 
that its admissions plan contained no "quota" even though the proportion of 
minority students admitted during the relevant period remained within a 
narrow, predictable range.93 The Court did not hold the Law School to any 
duty to exhaust all race-neutral means prior to resorting to race-conscious 
ones.94 Typically, in enacting an affirmative action program the government 
must not just consider, but must also exhaust, all race-neutral means prior to 
instituting a race-conscious measure.95 Stating that narrow tailoring requires 
only "good faith consideration" rather than "exhaustion of every conceivable 
race-neutral alternative," the Court ruled that the Law School would not be 
made to choose between diversity and excellence in an effort to come into 
compliance with the Equal Protection Clause.96 
Moreover, the Court characterized the purpose of the narrow tailoring 
requirement as a form of protection for non-favored individuals from any 
91 Id. 
92 Id. 
93 Id. at 383 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) ("But the correlation between the percentage of 
the Law School's pool of applicants who are members of the three minority groups and the 
percentage of the admitted applicants who are members of these same groups is far too 
precise to be dismissed as merely the result of the school paying ' some attention to [the] 
numbers ... . ' [F]rom 1995 through 2000 the percentage of admitted applicants who were 
members of these minority groups closely tracked the percentage of individuals in the 
school's applicant pool who were from the same groups."). 
94 Id. at 339 (majority opinion). 
95 Ian Ayres & Sydney Foster, Don't Tell, Don 't Ask: Narrow Tailoring After Grutter 
and Gratz, 85 TEX. L. REv. 517, 522 (2007). 
96 Grutter, 539 U.S. at 339. 
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"undue burden" imposed by the admissions plan.97 But this suggested, in this 
context at least, that some burden would indeed be tolerated.98 The Court 
suggested that individuals not favored under the Law School's admissions plan 
had not been "unduly burdened" because the plan provided for "individualized 
consideration" of each applicant.99 For the Court, individualized consideration 
meant that the Law School did not maintain a quota system, and that race 
operated as a "plus" factor for each applicant such that "each applicant is 
evaluated as an individual and not in a way that makes an applicant's race or 
ethnicity the defining feature of his or her application."100 
But it is not clear that such individualized consideration was truly 
meaningful for all applicants. As Justice Kennedy suggested in his dissent: 
With respect to 15% to 20% of the seats, race is likely outcome 
determinative for many members of minority groups. That is where the 
competition becomes tight and where any given applicant's chance of 
admission is far smaller if he or she lacks minority status. At this point 
the numerical concept of critical mass has the real potential to 
compromise individual review. 101 
Indeed, it is likely that the Law School's provision of individualized 
consideration for each applicant in the admissions process actually served to 
obscure the magnitude of the preferences accorded to underrepresented 
minority group members. 102 
Gratz v. Bollinger, 103 of course, reached a different conclusion with respect 
fo narrow tailoring. Gratz concerned the University of Michigan College of 
Literature, Science and the Arts' ("LSA") admissions policy, which assigned a 
certain number of points to various admissions factors including high school 
grades, test scores, high school quality and the applicant's racial and ethnic 
background. 104 Thus, the policy "automatically distributes 20 points, or one-
fifth of the points needed to guarantee admission, to every single 
'underrepresented minority' applicant solely because of race."105 The Court 
struck down the LSA's policy because it was "not narrowly tailored to achieve 
the interest in educational diversity that respondents claim justifies their 
97 Id. at 341. 
98 Id. 
99 Id. 
100 Id. at 337. 
101 Id. at 389 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
102 Ayres & Foster, supra note 95, at 559, 582 (arguing that because the Law School's 
admissions plan featured individualized consideration, the Court simply did not probe the 
weight given to racial preferences in the admissions scheme, and that "the affirmative action 
program the Supreme Court upheld in Grutter appears to have granted larger racial 
preferences than the program the Court struck down in Gratz"). 
103 539 U.S. 244 (2003). 
104 Id. at 253-55. 
105 Id. at 270. 
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program." 106 
Notwithstanding this result, it was possible to read Gratz quite narrowly. 
First, Gratz was silent on educational diversity as a compelling interest, 
effectively leaving Grutter's expansive assessment of that interest in place. 
Second, the LSA admissions program at issue in Gratz clearly quantified the 
scope and extent of the preference afforded to underrepresented minority 
students. But such an approach raised questions even under the then 
(apparently) prevailing Bakke standard. 107 Thus, it was possible given the level 
of deference afforded by the Grutter Court on both steps of strict scrutiny 
review to read Gratz as standing for the narrow proposition that governmental 
actors must not quantify the scope of the racial preference. From this 
perspective, narrow tailoring required individualized determinations where 
possible, that the preference be covert rather than overt, and that the preference 
not harm whites too much. As discussed below, this is almost certainly how 
several United States Courts of Appeals interpreted the two cases. 
II. POST-GRUITER V. BOLLINGER: A WINDOW ON THE POSSIBILITIES 
A. Primary and Secondary Public Education 
In late 2005, the United States Supreme Court denied certiorari in Comfort 
v. Lynn School Committee. 108 In Comfort, the First Circuit Court of Appeals 
upheld a voluntary desegregation plan intended to "achieve the educational 
benefits of racial diversity in the public schools."109 The plan at issue took 
race into account when a student sought a transfer to a school outside of his or 
her neighborhood. 110 Thus, under the plan, students were not allowed to make 
"segregative transfers," transfers that would "exacerbate racial imbalance in 
the sending or receiving school."111 Explicitly relying on the "analytic 
framework set forth in Grutter and Gratz,"112 the First Circuit ruled that the 
plan did not violate the Equal Protection Clause. 113 At least at that moment, 
with Justice O'Connor still sitting on the Court, a case which explicitly applied 
Grutter's analytical framework in a different context to uphold a voluntary 
desegregation plan did not seem to pique the Court's interest. 
Even assuming the Court would eventually take such a case, it was hard to 
imagine that local school districts would receive less deference with respect to 
w6 Id. 
w7 Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 319 (1978) (opinion of Powell, J.). 
108 546 U.S. 1061 (2005) (denying certiorari). 
109 Comfort v. Lynn Sch. Comm., 418 F.3d I , 5 (1st Cir. 2005) (en bane), cert. denied, 
546 U.S. 1061 (2005). 
110 Id. at 7. 
Ill Id. 
112 Id. at 6. 
I 13 Id. 
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their use of race than colleges and universities, given the centrality of 
eradicating state mandated school segregation to the Civil Rights Movement 
and the importance of Brown v. Board of Education in the constitutional 
pantheon. 114 And even if the Court applied strict scrutiny to local public 
school districts' voluntary use of race to achieve desegregation - a scrutiny 
level civil rights advocates argued against115 - surely the Court would apply 
the deferential rather than the robust version, as indicated by Grutter. That 
was the approach favored by the First Circuit in Comfort, and by the Sixth and 
Ninth Circuit Courts of Appeals in two voluntary desegregation cases that were 
overturned by the Supreme Court shortly after Justice Alito replaced Justice 
O'Connor: Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District, 
No. 1 116 and McFarland v. Jefferson County Public Schools. 11 1 
Parents Involved concerned the Seattle School District's 2001-2002 "open 
choice" plan, which sought to maximize school choice and enhance racial 
diversity. 118 More specifically, the Seattle School District advanced two 
interests to support its "open choice" plan: the "affirmative educational and 
social benefits that flow from racial diversity" and avoidance of "the harms 
resulting from racially concentrated or isolated schools."' 19 Under the plan, 
which applied to all of Seattle ' s public high schools, students were assigned to 
their first choice high school, except when a student selected a school that was 
"oversubscribed." 120 In the event of oversubscription, the school district 
assigned students based on a ranked series of tiebreakers. 121 The first 
tiebreaker gave a preference to students selecting a school where a sibling was 
already in attendance. 122 Race only became relevant at the second tiebreaker 
where an oversubscribed school was racially imbalanced. 123 Thus, at the 
second tiebreaker, the school district considered the student's race in making 
11 4 Brown v. Bd. of Educ. , 347 U.S. 483 (1954); see generally RISA GOLUBOFF, THE 
LOST PROMISE OF CIVIL RIGHTS (2007) (discussing the civil rights movement 's failure to 
address African-American workers' economic inequality). 
115 Brief for NAACP Legal Defense and Education Fund, Inc. as Amicus Curiae 
Supporting Respondents, Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 127 S. 
Ct. 2738 (2007) (Nos. 05-908 and 05-915). 
11 6 426F.3d1162 (9th Cir. 2005), rev 'd, 127 S. Ct. 2738 (2007). 
11 7 330 F. Supp. 2d 834 (W.D. Ky. 2004), affd, 416 F.3d 513 (6th Cir. 2005), rev'd, 127 
S. Ct. 2738 (2007). The Sixth Circuit's per curiam opinion adopted the district court 's 
reasoning in its entirety. McFarland, 416 F.3d at 513. Consequently, I will refer to the 
McFarland court' s reasoning as that of the Sixth Circuit. 
11 8 Parents Involved, 426 F.3d at 1168-69. 
119 Id. at 1174. 
120 Id. at 1169. 
121 Id. 
122 Id. 
123 Id. at 1169-70 ( defining "racially imbalanced" as when "the racial make up of its 
student body differs by more than 15 percent from the racial make up of the students of the 
Seattle public schools as a whole"). 
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school assignments in an effort to achieve a student body that more closely 
mirrored the racial make-up of the entire school district as a whole. 124 The 
race-based tiebreaker affected about 10% of all entering Seattle high school 
students. 125 
McFarland involved the Jefferson County Board of Education's 2001 
student assignment plan. 126 In contrast to the Seattle School District, 127 a 
federal court in 1973 found that the Jefferson County Public Schools 
"maintained a segregated school system."128 As a result, the Jefferson County 
Public Schools operated under a court-ordered desegregation decree until 
2000. 129 After the decree was dissolved, "Jefferson County adopted [a] 
voluntary student assignment plan." 130 Jefferson County's plan was organized 
not only to maximize student choice and maintain neighborhood schools, but 
also to fulfill the Board's primary objective of maintaining "a fully integrated 
countywide system ofschools."131 The Jefferson County plan "require[d] each 
school [within the district] to seek a Black student enrollment of at least 15% 
and no more than 50%."132 Prior to any consideration of race, administrators 
were to assign students to district schools based on a wide variety of factors. 133 
But where a school's racial composition bordered either end of the 15-50% 
range, "the application of any student for open enrollment, transfer or even to a 
magnet program could be affected."134 Thus, in some cases, a student's race 
124 Id. The racial breakdown of Seattle public school enrollment was approximately 
forty percent white and sixty percent nonwhite. Id. at 1166. 
125 Id. at 1170. During the 2001-2002 school year, the race-based tiebreaker operated at 
three out of the ten Seattle public high schools. Id. There were two other tiebreakers under 
the "open choice" plan. "In the third tiebreaker, students are admitted according to distance 
from the student's home to the high school." Id. at 1171. "In the fourth tiebreaker, a lottery 
is used to allocate the remaining seats." Id. 
126 McFarland v. Jefferson County Pub. Sch. , 330 F. Supp. 2d 834, 841-42 (W.D. Ky. 
2004), affd, 416 F.3d 513 (6th Cir. 2005), rev 'd, 127 S. Ct. 2738 (2007). Jefferson County 
operates the "public school system in metropolitan Louisville, Kentucky." Parents Involved 
in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. I, 127 S. Ct. 2738, 2749 (2007). 
127 Seattle never operated "legally separate schools for students of different races - nor 
has it ever been subject to court-ordered desegregation." Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. at 
2747. But see id. at 2810 (Breyer, J. , dissenting) (describing the history of racial 
segregation in Seattle public schools dating back to the end of World War II and arguing 
that a "court finding of de jure segregation cannot be the crucial variable"). 
128 Id. at 2749 (majority opinion). 
129 Id. 
130 Id. 
131 McFarland, 330 F. Supp. 2d at 842. 
132 Id. 
133 Those factors included residence, school capacity, popularity, random assignment and 
student choice. Id. 
134 Id. 
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could determine his or her school assignment. 135 Overall, the hallmark of the 
Jefferson County plan was discretion; the plan gave administrators broad 
authority to maintain schools within the prescribed range. 136 
Both Parents Involved and McFarland relied upon Grutter to support their 
holdings that the voluntary desegregation plans at issue did not violate the 
Equal Protection Clause. First, both courts referred to Grutter to buttress the 
assertion that the school districts had a compelling interest in using race 
voluntarily to promote integrated schools. 137 Second, both courts also cited 
Grutter for the proposition that the plans at issue were sufficiently narrowly 
tailored to withstand constitutional review. 138 
The courts' reliance on Grutter in the compelling interest portion of their 
analyses had a variety of benefits. First, it took some of the evidentiary issues 
off the table. There is powerful evidence to support the statement that "with 
few exceptions, separate schools are still unequal schools."139 But the question 
of desegregation's impact on affected students, and more specifically whether 
K-12 desegregation results in enhanced learning, has been the subject of 
significant and extended debate. 140 In Grutter, the Court simply accepted that 
the benefits of racial diversity were "not theoretical but real." 141 To the extent 
that school districts could persuade lower courts that Grutter applied in the K-
12 context, those courts could then simply accept the validity of racial 
diversity's (broadly defined) benefits. Grutter's application in the K-12 
context reduced the evidentiary burden on school boards. To be sure, the 
school boards still needed to present evidence of the benefits of racial diversity 
that are unique to the public school context, 142 but Grutter's application 
135 Id. 
136 Id. 
137 See Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. I, 426 F.3d 1162, 1175 
(9th Cir. 2005), rev 'd, 127 S. Ct. 2738 (2007); McFarland, 330 F. Supp. 2d at 853. 
138 See Parents Involved, 426 F.3d at 1180; McFarland, 330 F. Supp. 2d at 856. 
139 Parents Involved, 426 F.3d at I 177 (citing ERICA FRANKENBERG ET AL., A 
MULTIRACIAL SOCIETY WITH SEGREGATED SCHOOLS: ARE WE LOSING THE DREAM? 11 
(2003)). 
140 See, e.g., McFarland, 330 F. Supp. 2d at 853 ("[O]ne of Defendant's experts testified 
that racial integration benefits Black students substantially in terms of academic 
achievement. The Court cannot be certain to what extent the policy of an integrated school 
system has contributed to these successes. Opinions surely vary on this issue."). 
141 Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 330 (2003). 
142 While the benefits of integration at various educational levels overlap, they are not 
identical. As James E. Ryan has suggested, "[c]olleges and graduate schools on the one 
hand, and public schools on the other, are not attempting to achieve exactly the same goals 
when using race in selecting students, and the correct application of strict scrutiny requires 
careful attention to these differences." James E. Ryan, Voluntary Integration: Asking the 
Right Questions, 67 Omo ST. L.J. 327, 333 (2006). Indeed, both the Parents Involved court 
and the McFarland court emphasized that racial integration at the K-12 level had distinct 
benefits. Both Parents Involved and McFarland ruled that the school districts met the 
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relieved the school boards of the need to independently establish the validity of 
racial integration's benefits that are common to both contexts. 
Both Parents Involved and McFarland reasoned by way of analogy. In 
Parents Involved, the Ninth Circuit ruled that the school district's interest in 
capturing the educational and social benefits that flow from diversity at the K-
12 level were sufficiently analogous to the benefits of diversity identified in 
Grutter as to form a compelling governmental interest. 143 The Ninth Circuit's 
analysis tied the benefits of racial diversity at the secondary school level to 
both the endogenous and exogenous benefits of racial diversity recognized by 
Grutter in the context of higher education. For instance, the Ninth Circuit 
accepted evidence that racial diversity in secondary education enhanced both 
white and black students' critical thinking skills, "the ability to both 
understand and challenge views which are different from their own."144 This 
finding mapped directly onto the Grutter Court's findings regarding the 
importance of racial diversity in promoting the "cross-racial understanding"145 
that breaks "down racial stereotypes" and enables students "to better 
understand persons of different races,"146 enhancing the educational 
expenence. 
Second, the Ninth Circuit found that racial diversity improved race relations, 
reduced prejudicial attitudes, and created a more "inclusive experience for all 
citizens."147 These benefits were not necessarily specific to the immediate 
educational experience, but instead were "long lasting" and embodied durable 
extra-educational social goals. 148 The Ninth Circuit concluded that these 
benefits encourage "students not only to think critically but also 
democratically."149 These observations echoed the exogenous benefits of 
racial diversity recognized by the Grutter Court. 150 The Ninth Circuit also 
emphasized the role that public secondary education plays in a democracy, 
training students for their roles as workers and citizens. Here the court 
analogized to Grutter, and also emphasized the special role that secondary 
schools play in inculcating democratic values. 151 Consequently, the court ruled 
compelling interest requirement both because of the Grutter analogy and because of the 
benefits of integrated schools that are unique to the K-12 setting. Parents Involved, 426 
F.3d at 1177; McFarland, 330 F. Supp. 2d at 854. 
143 Parents Involved, 426 F.3d at 1173-77. 
144 Id. at 1174. 
145 Grutter, 539 U.S. at 330. 
146 Id. 
147 Parents Involved, 426 F.3d at 1175. 
14s Id. 
149 Id. The court also accepted evidence suggesting a desegregated education "opens 
opportunity networks" and is correlated with cross-racial friendships and students' 
propensity to live in integrated communities as adults. Id. 
150 See supra Part I.B. 
151 Parents Involved, 426 F.3d at 1175. 
960 BOSTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 88:937 
that the school district "has demonstrated that it has a compelling interest in the 
educational and social benefits of racial diversity similar to those articulated by 
the Supreme Court in Grutter as well as the additional compelling educational 
and social benefits of such diversity unique to the public secondary school 
context."152 
The Sixth Circuit's approach in McFarland was similar. There, the court 
noted the importance of cross-racial understanding, racial tolerance, 
preparation for a diverse workforce and the leadership claim from Grutter's 
analysis, and then analogized those benefits to the instant context: "[l]ike 
institutions of higher education, elementary and secondary schools are 'pivotal 
to sustaining our political and cultural heritage with a fundamental role in 
maintaining the fabric of society. "'153 Consequently, the Sixth Circuit held the 
school board met the compelling governmental interest requirement because of 
the similarity between the benefits of racial diversity articulated by Grutter and 
those identified in the K-12 context by the school board. 154 The Ninth and 
Sixth Circuits' reliance on Grutter in the compelling interest portion of their 
analyses had another benefit: it assisted the courts in deferring to the local 
school districts' educational choices, since in Grutter the Court deferred to the 
Law School on both prongs of the strict scrutiny analysis. 155 
Of course, a preliminary question is why Grutter is needed to trigger judicial 
deference at all. Arguably, Grutter's application is unnecessary to activate 
court deference to local school districts in evaluating their voluntary 
desegregation plans. After all, the Supreme Court repeatedly emphasized the 
importance of local control in public education. 156 The emphasis on local 
control, however, arose primarily in a line of doctrine that considered the scope 
of federal judicial supervision over public school districts that were found 
liable for intentional school segregation.157 Let us call this type of deference 
"federalism-based" deference to distinguish it from "Grutter-style" deference. 
Prior to the Supreme Court's determination in Parents Involved, it was unclear 
whether the deference afforded local school districts in determining whether a 
federal desegregation order should be dissolved should be extended to local 
152 Id. at 1177. 
153 McFarland v. Jefferson County Pub. Sch., 330 F. Supp. 2d 834, 852-53 (W.D. Ky. 
2004) (quoting Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 331 (2003)), ajf'd, 416 F.3d 513 (6th Cir. 
2005), rev 'd, 127 S. Ct. 2738 (2007). 
154 Id. at 837 (holding the compelling interest requirement was met because of similarity 
to Grutter and because "the Board has described other compelling interests and benefits of 
integrated schools, such as improved student education and community support for public 
schools, that were not relevant in the law school context but are relevant to public 
elementary and secondary schools"). 
155 See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 328, 334 (2003). 
156 McFarland, 330 F. Supp. 2d at 850 n.30. 
157 Id. The Court has emphasized the importance of local control in other contexts as 
well. See, e.g., Washington v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 458 U.S. 457, 481-82 (1982); San 
Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 49-51 (1973). 
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school districts ' voluntary desegregation efforts. 158 
Enter Grutter. If Grutter simply applied in the K-12 context, a court did not 
need to reach this question. Or, if a court rejected the wholesale application of 
Grutter-style deference because of the differences in the two contexts, a court 
could still point to Grutter's embrace of deference in the higher education 
context to bolster its application of "federalism-based" deference in the 
voluntary desegregation context. Indeed, in McFarland, the Sixth Circuit 
pursued exactly this course. 
The Sixth Circuit began by noting that the Supreme Court had long 
endorsed the importance of local control of school districts.159 It then 
characterized that deference as an aspect of federalism and distinguished it 
from the type of deference the Court recognized in Grutter. 160 The court 
subsequently ruled that because of the difference in contexts, Grutter-style 
deference "is not relevant here." 161 But if Grutter-style deference was "not 
relevant," what was the purpose of drawing a distinction between it and the 
deference traditionally accorded local school districts? Or of discussing 
Grutter-style deference at all? The answer takes us back to the question posed 
above: it was not clear whether courts should apply federalism-based deference 
to local school districts' voluntary use of race to promote desegregation. But if 
the Supreme Court had accorded deference to colleges and universities in their 
use of race to achieve educational diversity, the rhetorical argument seemed to 
be: how could a court assessing a voluntary public school desegregation plan 
fail to follow suit? Thus, the McFarland court observed that it "would seem 
rather odd that the concepts of equal protection, local control and limited 
deference are now only one-way streets to a particular educational policy, 
virtually prohibiting the voluntary continuation of policies once required by 
law."162 
In evaluating the narrow tailoring analysis in McFarland and Parents 
Involved, it is useful to note a fundamental principle that informed each court's 
analysis: Grutter and Gratz, rather than Croson and Adarand, controlled.163 
Both the Sixth and Ninth Circuits assumed that Grutter and Gratz framed the 
narrow tailoring analysis rather than the less deferential remedial cases because 
they concerned admissions policies which are more "like" the challenged 
student assignment policies than minority set-asides in public contracting.164 
Indeed, both courts performed the narrow tailoring analysis assuming not just 
158 See Bd. of Educ. v. Dowell, 498 U.S. 237, 248 (1991) (reversing dissolution order). 
159 McFarland, 330 F. Supp. 2d at 850. 
160 Id. ("The historical importance of the deference accorded to local school boards goes 
to the very heart of our democratic form of government."). 
161 Id. at 850 n.31. 
162 Id. at 851. 
163 See Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 426 F.3d 1162, 1166 
(9th Cir. 2005), rev 'd, 127 S. Ct. 2738 (2007); McFarland, 330 F. Supp. 2d at 837. 
164 See Parents Involved, 426 F.3d at 1166; McFarland, 330 F. Supp. 2d at 837. 
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that Grutter and Gratz applied, but that aspects of that analysis could be 
modified to take account of contextual differences. This later assumption was 
made possible by Grutter's emphasis on the context in which the racial 
classification is used. 165 
The Ninth Circuit's analysis in Parents Involved explicitly followed the lead 
of Grutter and Gratz. 166 From those cases, the court identified five markers of 
a narrowly tailored affirmative action plan: "(I) individualized consideration of 
applicants; (2) the absence of quotas; (3) serious, good-faith consideration of 
race-neutral alternatives to the affirmative action program; ( 4) that no member 
of any racial group was unduly harmed; and ( 5) that the program had a sunset 
provision or some other end point." 167 The court then applied these markers in 
a context-specific fashion, emphasizing some while deemphasizing others 
based upon their applicability to the K-12 context. 
For instance, the Ninth Circuit dispensed with Grutter's individualized 
consideration requirement, and held that this type of consideration was not 
necessary in the K-12 context. 168 In the court's view, individualized, holistic 
consideration at the university level was necessary to insure equal competition 
and reduce stigma in the context of a merit-based admissions determination. 169 
But at the K-12 level, there was no merits determination; every student was 
guaranteed a spot in one of Seattle's public high schools. 170 Thus, the sole 
question was allocative rather than merit-based: to which public school would 
each student be assigned? At the same time, the Ninth Circuit noted no student 
possessed a "right" to attend any particular public school. 171 While 
recognizing particular students' school preferences might be frustrated, the 
165 Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 327 (2003) ("Context matters when reviewing 
race-based governmental action under the Equal Protection Clause. . . . Not every decision 
influenced by race is equally objectionable, and strict scrutiny is designed to provide a 
framework for carefully examining the importance and the sincerity of the reasons advanced 
by the governmental decisionmaker for the use of race in that particular context."). Justice 
Breyer's Parents Involved dissent makes this point emphatically. Parents Involved in Cmty. 
Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 127 S. Ct. 2738, 2800 (2007) (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
166 See Parents Involved, 426 F.3d at 1180 ("Here, our analysis is framed by the Court's 
narrow tailoring analysis in Grutter and Gratz, which, though informed by considerations 
specific to the higher education context, substantially guides our inquiry."); McFarland, 330 
F. Supp. 2d at 856 ("[T]he Court will evaluate whether the 2001 Plan is narrowly 
tailored . . . in light of the factual and analytical differences between this case and the 
admissions programs reviewed in Grutter and Gratz."). For the sake of brevity, my 
discussion of how Grutter and Gratz informed the courts' narrow tailoring analyses focuses 
primarily on the Ninth Circuit's decision. 
167 Parents Involved, 426 F.3d at 1180. 
168 Id. at 1180-81 ("This [holistic] focus on an applicant's qualifications ... is not 
applicable when there is no competition or consideration of qualifications at issue."). 
169 Id. 
170 Id. at 1181. 
171 ld.atll8ln.21. 
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Ninth Circuit ruled that because "no stigma results from any particular school 
assignment,"172 individualized determinations were unnecessary. 173 
In McFarland, however, the Sixth Circuit ruled the student assignment plan 
did provide individualized review, asserting that "like the law school, the ... 
assignment process focuses a great deal of attention upon the individual 
characteristics of a student's application, such as place ofresidence and student 
choice of school or program." 174 Yet the Sixth Circuit reached this conclusion 
by tailoring its analysis of the individualized review requirement to a "totally 
different context."175 This contextual approach allowed the court to rule race 
was one factor among many in determining student assignment. 176 Thus, with 
respect to individualized determinations, both the Sixth and Ninth Circuits 
believed their analyses were consistent with the requirements of Grutter and 
Gratz. However, as discussed below, the Supreme Court rejected both 
approaches, signaling the newly enhanced importance of individualized 
determinations. 177 
Next, in Parents Involved, the Ninth Circuit ruled the voluntary 
desegregation plan did not contain an impermissible quota.1 78 Characterizing 
the race-based tiebreaker as flexible in application, the court held there was no 
quota because the "race-based tiebreaker does not set aside a fixed number of 
slots for nonwhite or white students in any of the District's schools."179 
Instead, the Ninth Circuit noted the tiebreaker only came into play when a 
school was oversubscribed, and that the number of white and nonwhite 
students in the high schools varied from year-to-year.1 80 Under Seattle's plan, 
the race-based tiebreaker was triggered only when the racial demographics at 
an oversubscribed school were within "plus or minus 15 percent of the 
District's demographics." 181 Analogizing to the Grutter Court's discussion of 
"critical mass," the Ninth Circuit reasoned that the District's 15% plus or 
minus variance was necessary to provide a "critical mass of students needed to 
172 Id. at 1181. 
173 Id. at 1184. The court also justified its conclusion that no individualized 
determinations were necessary "[b ]ecause race itself is the relevant consideration" when the 
school district attempts to redress de facto segregation. Id. at 1183. 
174 McFarland v. Jefferson County Pub. Sch., 330 F. Supp. 2d 834, 859 (W.D. Ky. 2004), 
affd, 416 F.3d 513 (6th Cir. 2005), rev 'd, 127 S. Ct. 2738 (2007). 
11s Id. 
176 Id. ("Many factors determine student assignment, including address, student choice, 
lottery placement, and, at the margins, the racial guidelines. But, race is simply one possible 
factor among many, acting only occasionally as a permissible 'tipping' factor in most of the 
... assignment process."). 
177 See infra Part III. 
178 Parents Involved, 426 F.3d at 1184. 
119 Id. 
180 Id. at 1184-85. 
18 1 Id. at 1169. 
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'realize the educational benefits of a diverse student body. "' 182 Consequently, 
there was no quota. 183 
In ruling that the school district had considered race-neutral alternatives and 
found them ineffective, the Ninth Circuit applied Grutter-style deference. 184 
Recall that one hallmark of Grutter's narrow tailoring analysis was the Law 
School was not required to choose between its educational and diversity 
objectives. 185 Thus, the Court did not require the Law School to "lower 
admissions standards for all students" because such a "drastic remedy ... 
would require the Law School to become a much different institution and 
sacrifice a vital component of its educational mission."186 That is, Grutter 
ruled the Law School could use racial preferences and pursue other 
institutional objectives. 
The Ninth Circuit followed this approach. The court neither required the 
school district to exhaust race-neutral alternatives, nor select less effective 
methods in order to pursue its goal. 187 The school district could, for instance, 
pursue its institutional goal of fostering parental and student choice while at 
the same time advancing racial diversity within the district. 188 Consequently, 
the Ninth Circuit deferred to the school district and found that a poverty 
classification, de-emphasis of the race-based tiebreaker, and a lottery system 
would all have been less effective in achieving the school district's varied 
goals.189 Finally, the Ninth Circuit ruled the school district's plan minimized 
harm to whites and was appropriately time-limited because the plan contained 
a periodic review requirement. l90 
While the Sixth Circuit did not defer to Jefferson County on the narrow 
tailoring prong of the strict scrutiny analysis, 191 it concluded the school district 
met all of the narrow tailoring requirements. First, there was no quota because 
"one finds neither an automatic assignment nor a 'narrow band' of percentages 
of Black students among [Jefferson County Public] schools."192 Second, for 
the reasons discussed above, the court ruled the individualized review 
182 Id. at 1185. 
183 Id. at 1186. 
184 See id. at 1188. 
185 Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 309 (2003). 
186 Id. at 340. 
187 See Parents Involved, 426 F.3d at 1191. 
188 See id. 
189 Id. at 1187-91 ("[W]hen a racially diverse school system is the goal (or racial 
concentration or isolation is the problem), there is no more effective means than a 
consideration ofrace to achieve the solution."). 
190 Id. at 1191-93 ( explaining that the school district revisits the plan annually and is 
responsive to the parents' and students' choice patterns). 
191 McFarland v. Jefferson County Pub. Sch., 330 F. Supp. 2d 834, 856 (W.D. Ky. 2004), 
affd, 416 F.3d 513 (6th Cir. 2005), rev'd, 127 S. Ct. 2738 (2007). 
192 Id. at 856-58. 
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requirement was met. Third, the court ruled white students were not harmed 
by the student assignment plan because "no student is directly denied a benefit 
because of race so that another of a different race can receive that benefit."193 
Finally, the court ruled that the "Board not only considered, but actually 
implemented, a variety ofrace-neutral strategies to achieve its goals."194 
In sum, both cases bore Grutter's distinct imprint. As I argued above, it was 
quite possible to interpret Grutter as providing a "green light" to government 
to use racial preferences to pursue racial diversity where such diversity 
generated significant positive social externalities and whites were not unduly 
harmed. Because Grutter emphasized the importance of individualized 
determinations in a highly selective merits-based context, it was perfectly 
reasonable for the government to assume it was not required to perform 
individualized determinations in other contexts where it was inefficient or 
disruptive to do so. With this view of Grutter, individualized determinations 
were highly recommended but not absolutely mandatory. At the same time, it 
was perfectly reasonable for government to interpret Gratz narrowly; the scope 
and the nature of the racial preference must be covert rather than overt in order 
to reduce the politics of racial hostility. This is almost certainly how the Sixth 
and Ninth Circuit Courts of Appeals understood Grutter and Gratz. These 
assumptions, however, turned out to be incorrect in the eyes of the Supreme 
Court. 
B. Public Employment 
Public employers, like public universities, are institutions that are similarly 
situated in their ability to disperse the social benefits Grutter associated with 
racial diversity. In Grutter, the Court recognized that the university is a 
particularly effective vehicle for the provision and dispersal of the benefits 
associated with interracial interaction. 195 But colleges and universities are not 
necessarily the only institutional actors well-suited to this task. Cynthia 
Estlund argues that racial and ethnic integration within the workplace 
strengthens social bonds among individuals, which in tum, "produce more 
positive attitudes and relations across ethnic and racial lines."196 
Indeed, Justice Scalia's Grutter dissent observed (with more than a hint of 
irony) that the compelling interest identified by the majority could not even be 
characterized as providing an "educational benefit."197 After all, the benefits 
associated with cross-racial understanding were not "uniquely relevant to law 
school."198 Instead, those benefits of racial diversity were "lesson[s] of life 
193 Id. at 861. 
194 Id. 
195 Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 330-31 (2003). 
196 See CYNTHIA L. ESTLUND, WORKING TOGETHER: How WORKPLACE BONDS 
STRENGTHEN A DIVERSE DEMOCRACY 11 (2003). 
197 Grutter, 539 U.S. at 347 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
19s Id. 
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rather than law,"199 which could (and perhaps should) be provided in contexts 
exogenous to the university setting. Justice Scalia argued, if it is appropriate 
for the University of Michigan to take account of race to provide these 
benefits, then "surely it is no less appropriate - indeed, particularly appropriate 
- for the civil service system of the State of Michigan to do so."200 
A significant question after Gruffer was whether public employers had a 
compelling interest in using racial preferences to obtain racial diversity when 
such diversity assists the public employer's "operational needs."201 The 
operational needs argument connects the ability of the public employer to 
perform its public function directly to the presence of a racially diverse 
workforce. Thus, "[t]he argument is that for certain government agencies, 
such as local police departments, to be effective and have the cooperation and 
confidence of the communities they serve, the agencies must demonstrably 
represent all racial segments of the local community."202 
This argument links to the relationship Gruffer recognized between "cross-
racial understanding" and the learning process.203 Recall that in Gruffer, the 
Court deferred to the Law School with respect to the relationship between the 
need for racial diversity and its educational mission.204 The Court simply 
accepted that "such diversity is essential to [the Law School's] educational 
mission."205 Deferring to the Law School, the Court held "cross-racial 
understanding" enhanced the educational experience because it "promotes 
learning outcomes."206 The upshot is that without racial diversity, the 
government's ability to function as an effective educator is diminished. In this 
way, Gruffer stands for the proposition that racial diversity is an "operational 
need" of government when it acts as educator. This makes sense when we 
reflect on Grutter's simultaneous rejection of "outright racial balancing, which 
is patently unconstitutional."207 Gruffer does not simply accept a "diversity 
rationale"208 as a compelling governmental interest, but instead accepts that 
rationale as constitutive of other important and widely-shared social goods: an 
enhanced educational experience, business competitiveness and military 
199 Id. 
200 Id. at 34 7-48. 
201 See Michael K. Fridkin, The Permissibility of Non-Remedial Justifications for Racial 
Preferences in Public Contracting, 24 N. ILL. U. L. REv. 509, 515 (2004) ("Besides 
diversity, a frequent candidate for consideration as a non-remedial justification for racial 
preferences is an agency's "operational needs."). 
202 Id. 
203 Grutter, 539 U.S. at 308. 
204 Id. at 328. 
20s Id. 
206 Id. at 330. 
201 Id. 
208 Lorin J. Lapidus, Diversity 's Divergence: A Post-Grutter Examination of Racial 
Preferences in Public Employment, 28 W. NEW ENG. L. REv. 199, 248 (2006). 
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readiness, and effective leadership in a modem democracy.209 
In 2005, the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey ruled 
the City of Newark had a compelling interest in eliminating de facto 
segregation in the city's firehouses, and the benefits of diversity "better 
prepare[] a firefighter to work effectively with his colleagues" which "can only 
improve their performance in their often dangerous work."210 While the Third 
Circuit ultimately disagreed and overturned the district court's decision,211 th1r 
Seventh Circuit explicitly adopted the "operational needs" approach in the law 
enforcement context. In Petit v. City of Chicago,212 the Seventh Circuit found 
that racial diversity benefited individual police officers, the Chicago Police 
Department ("CPD") as an institution, and the community the department 
served.213 
In Petit, white police officers challenged an examination that determined 
promotion to the rank of sergeant.214 The test had an adverse impact on 
African-American and Hispanic officers; rank order promotion based on exam 
scores would have resulted in few promotions for members of those groups.215 
The City corrected for this result by "standardizing" the examination results 
based on race.216 The white police officers argued that a "standardization" 
209 Grutter, 539 U.S. at 330-31. 
210 Lomack v. City of Newark, No. Civ.A.04-6085(JWB), 2005 WL 2077479, at *7 
(D.N.J. Aug. 25, 2005), rev 'd, 463 F.3d 303 (3d Cir. 2006). 
211 Lomack v. City of Newark, 463 F.3d 303, 305 (3d Cir. 2006) (holding that the City of 
Newark may not "employ a race-based transfer and assignment policy when any racial 
imbalance ... is not the result of past intentional discrimination by the city"). Of particular 
concern to the Third Circuit was the breadth of the district court's interpretation of Grutter. 
Id. at 310 ("Grutter does not stand for the proposition that the ... benefits of diversity are 
always a compelling interest, regardless of the context."). For the Third Circuit, Grutter 
"stands for the narrow premise that the educational benefits of diversity can be a compelling 
interest to an institution whose mission is to educate. The Fire Department's mission is not 
to educate." Id. 
212 352 F.3d 1111 (7th Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 541 U.S. 1074 (2004). 
213 Id. at 1115 (holding that a diverse population would "set the proper tone in the 
department and ... earn the trust of the community, which in tum [would increase] police 
effectiveness in protecting the city"). 
214 Id. at 1112. 
215 Id. at 1116-17. 
216 Id. at 1117. At the time the challenged examination was given, the City of Chicago 
was under a federal court order "not to promote officers on rank-order examinations unless 
it could document the test's validity as a rank order promotional device." Id. at 1116. 
Validity meant the city had to show there was a relationship between the testing mechanism 
and job tasks in the new position. Id. Thus, validity turned on whether the city could 
demonstrate that an applicant's high score on the promotion test would "result in better 
performance as a sergeant." Id. In order to comply with the validity requirement, the city 
"standardized" the examination scores based on race, thereby "removing [the] differences 
between the scores" between white applicants and black and Hispanic applicants. Id. at 
1117. These standardized scores were then used to determine promotion order. Id. 
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process that attempted "to produce results that reflected the score the candidate 
would have received if the test had not had an adverse impact" violated the 
Equal Protection Clause.217 The Seventh Circuit did not uphold the CPD's 
affirmative action plan against constitutional challenge as an appropriate 
remedy for past intentional discrimination;218 instead, the Seventh Circuit 
accepted the CPD's argument that the "affirmative action promotions"219 did 
not violate the Equal Protection Clause because they promoted "diversity in a 
large metropolitan police force charged with protecting a racially and 
ethnically divided major American city."220 
The Seventh Circuit began its analysis with an extended discussion of 
Grutter's vision of diversity, noting that the Grutter Court "deferred to the law 
school's educational judgment that 'such diversity is essential to its 
educational mission."'221 From there, the court connected educational 
diversity to the operational needs of the police department and suggested that 
the need for diversity in this context might be "even more compelling" than in 
higher education.222 When the government acts to protect public safety, racial 
diversity on the force and particularly in supervisory positions is essential to 
that mission.223 The Seventh Circuit recognized that racial diversity has many 
benefits, including boosting the operational effectiveness of a force that must 
police a multi-racial rather than homogeneous community.224 This is 
211 Id. 
218 See id. at 1114. The central rule for public entities seeking to justify the use of racial 
preferences as a remedy for intentional discrimination is the following: while "no formal, 
judicial determination of past discrimination by the governmental unit in question is 
necessary to show the requisite compelling governmental interest," "evidence of such 
discrimination must be 'strong' or 'convincing."' LEWIS & NORMAN, supra note 57, at 386. 
Consequently, a public employer's voluntary affirmative action plan that seeks to remedy 
intentional discrimination will be evaluated using a more robust version of strict scrutiny 
review than the Grutter Court applied. Indeed, the district court below denied the city's 
motion for summary judgment on the issue of whether there was evidence of "past 
discrimination . . . adequate to establish a compelling interest to cure the effects of past 
discrimination." Petit v. City of Chicago, 239 F. Supp. 2d 761, 778-87 (N.D. Ill. 2002), 
ajf'd, 352 F.3d 1111 (7th Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 541 U.S. 1074 (2004). At the same time, 
the district court granted the city's summary judgment motion on the issue of whether the 
operational need interest was compelling. Id. at 794. For reasons I will discuss, the Seventh 
Circuit affirmed that holding on appeal. Petit, 352 F.3d at 1111. 




223 Id. (explaining that the Seventh Circuit had "left open a small window for forms of 
discrimination that are supported by compelling public safety concerns" (quoting Reynolds 
v. City of Chicago, 296 F.3d 524, 530 (7th Cir. 2002))). 
224 Id. at 1115 ("Effective police work, including the detection and apprehension of 
criminals, requires that the police have the trust of the community and they are more likely 
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consistent with Grutter's approach, which recognized that while the 
educational experience itself was richer with the presence of a racially diverse 
class, there were also a variety of benefits that were temporally and spatially 
exogenous to the university experience. 225 
Next, the Seventh Circuit explicitly deferred to the CPD with regard to the 
relationship between racial diversity and its operational needs.226 The court 
saw no need to limit judicial deference to the academic arena.227 Thus, the 
Seventh Circuit applied Grutter "lock, stock, and barrel," first applying the 
diversity rationale to the public employment context and then deferring to the 
governmental actor that "affirmative action was warranted to enhance" its 
operations. 228 
Deferring to the "views of experts and Chicago police executives [on] 
affirmative action,"229 the Seventh Circuit found that a large metropolitan 
police force must be racially diverse because it will enhance "the public's 
perception of the CPD, which in turn enhance[s] the department's ability to 
prevent and solve crime."230 The CPD's enhanced institutional effectiveness 
simultaneously benefited the community.231 Along these lines, the Seventh 
Circuit found additional minority sergeants were uniquely positioned to defuse 
"potentially explosive situations."232 But beyond the effects a more racially 
diverse department had on the department's effectiveness and the community's 
well-being, the court also found such diversity benefited individual police 
officers by "changing [their] attitudes."233 Consequently, the court ruled that 
the CPD had a compelling interest in "a diverse population at the rank of 
sergeant in order to set the proper tone in the department and to earn the trust 
of the community, which in turn increases police effectiveness in protecting 
the city. "234 
to have it if they have 'ambassadors' to the community of the same [race or] ethnicity." 
(quoting Reynolds, 296 F.3d at 529)). The Petit court also recognized that diversity among 
police supervisors internally changed the "attitudes of officers." See id. 
225 Cynthia L. Estlund, Putting Grutter to Work: Diversity, Integration, and Affirmative 
Action in the Workplace, 26 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. l, 34 (2005) ("But Grutter, and its 
recognition that racially integrated institutions do great social good and advance the cause of 
equality . .. should allow public employers to recover their 'normal' entitlement to 
deference in the defense of employment decisions that help to advance that project of 
institutional integration."). 
226 Petit, 352 F.3d at 1114. 
227 Id. at 1115. 
228 Id. at 1114. 
229 Id. 
230 Id. at 1115. 
231 Id. at 1114-15 ("[W]hen police officers are routinely supervised by minorities, the 
fears that the police department is hostile to the minority community will naturally abate."). 
232 Id. at 1115. 
233 Id. 
234 Id. 
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The Seventh Circuit also applied the narrow tailoring test in a deferential 
fashion. The court ruled the standardization process was narrowly tailored 
essentially because the interests of the white candidates were not unduly 
burdened. 235 This outcome was completely consistent with Grutter-style 
narrow tailoring; the outcome on a more rigorous application of narrow 
tailoring would be more dubious. For instance, the Seventh Circuit noted that 
all of the promoted candidates were "uniformly qualified for promotion,"236 
suggesting that no unqualified candidate of color was promoted ahead of a 
qualified white candidate. Yet under a more stringent application of narrow 
tailoring review, that the favored candidates were also qualified would not 
necessarily allow the affirmative action program to withstand constitutional 
review.237 
Next, the Seventh Circuit distinguished the standardization process used by 
the CPD from the fixed number of bonus points awarded to underrepresented 
minority candidates seeking admission to the LSA, which the Supreme Court 
struck down in Gratz.238 In the court's view, the standardization process 
passed muster because it did not affect "every 'minimally qualified' candidate" 
as it did in Gratz.239 However, it is not clear that every minimally qualified 
minority must receive a benefit in order for a racial preference scheme to flunk 
narrow tailoring. A stricter application of the narrow tailoring test would focus 
on barriers to competition created by the affirmative action program, an 
approach that is consistent with Croson and Adarand.240 The Seventh Circuit 
read Grutter broadly (similar positive externalities, deference on both prongs 
of narrow tailoring)241 and Gratz narrowly (every minority must benefit from 
the racial preference).242 Until Parents Involved, such an approach was a 
perfectly logical reading of the two cases. Finally, the Seventh Circuit ruled 
that the standardization process was narrowly tailored because it functioned to 
"eliminat[ e] an advantage the white officers had on the test. "243 But this 
rationale - affirmative action being necessary to offset whites' advantages -
235 Id. at 1117 ("[S]tandardizing the scores can be seen not as an arbitrary advantage 
given to the minority officers, but rather as eliminating an advantage the white officers had 
on the test."). 
236 Id. (arguing that even the lowest scoring members of each racial group scored at least 
ten points above the passing score). 
237 See, e.g., Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 25 f-55 (2003) (holding the school's plan 
unconstitutional because an applicant from an underrepresented minority could be granted 
admission when that applicant scored into the same range as a Caucasian applicant who was 
not admitted). 
238 Petit, 352 F.3d at 1117. 
239 Id. 
240 See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 238 (1995); Richmond v. J.A. 
Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469,493 (1989). 
241 See Petit, 352 F.3d at 1114. 
242 See id. at 111 7. 
243 Id. 
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flies in the face of much affirmative action doctrine.244 
The Seventh Circuit's approach to determining whether the affirmative 
action promotions survived constitutional review suggested that the court 
viewed Gruffer as perfectly applicable to the public employment context. The 
Seventh Circuit's assumption was grounded in a particular view of Grutter: it 
is applicable to contexts where the governmental actor can show racial 
diversity within its particular hierarchy generates positive externalities similar 
to those recognized by Grutter in the higher education context. As discussed 
below, that interpretation of Grutter is more difficult to support after the 
decision in Parents Involved. 
C. Public Contracting 
My discussion of the compelling interest identified in Grutter largely 
centered on the underlying "public interest" the Court balanced against the 
interests of frustrated white applicants to the Law School. While I 
recharacterized that interest as the "common good," I defined the benefits 
associated with the use of racial preferences in higher education as essentially 
prospective rather than remedial, and available to a broader group instead of 
confined to a narrow sub-class.245 One argument is that the government's use 
of racial preferences in public contracting can be justified on the basis that they 
contribute to the "common good" and generate a universal or nearly universal 
benefit that is widely shared. This line of argument raises a startling 
possibility: to the extent Gruffer applies to all governmental uses of race, 
including public contracting, it overruled Croson and Adarand sub silentio. 
After all, if Gruffer provides an additional rationaie for the government's use 
of race in the public contracting context, then the government need not meet 
the much more onerous requirements of the remedial approach. 
Indeed, while it is difficult to apply Gruffer to the public contracting 
context, it is not impossible. Along these lines, one positive externality 
associated with minority set-asides in public contracting programs is the 
governmental unit's own "vital economic development."246 In Builders 
Association of Greater Chicago v. City of Chicago,247 Chicago attempted to 
justify its public works set-aside program by arguing that "there is an 
economic benefit which justifies the City's racial and gender preferences."248 
The city's position was that its own economic development was greatly 
244 Croson, 488 U.S. at 486 (rejecting both the argument that legislatures are limited to 
remedial efforts to counteract prior discrimination and the argument that legislatures have 
broad power to "define and attack the effects of prior discrimination"); see also Adarand, 
515 U.S. at 239 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) ("[U]nder our 
Constitution there can be no such thing as either a creditor or·a debtor race."). 
245 See supra Part I.B. 
246 Fridkin, supra note 20 I, at 522. 
247 No. 96C 1122, 2003 WL 1786489 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 2, 2003). 
248 Id. at *7. 
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enhanced by the presence of minority-owned firms, and therefore its interest in 
the set-aside program was compelling.249 One commentator described the link 
between Chicago's economic benefit and its set-aside program as follows: 
Minority-owned firms locate themselves within the City's disadvantaged 
areas, and hire workers residing within those areas, at rates much greater 
than the nonminority firms. Therefore, racial contracting preferences 
result in the City retaining within its economic boundaries in general, and 
its disadvantaged areas in particular, tens of millions of its own public tax 
dollars. This retention has helped the City achieve vital economic 
stimulation: a rehabilitated property tax base, increased employment, 
raised wages and ignited business activity in disadvantaged areas and 
throughout the City.250 
In a decision handed down shortly before Grutter was decided, the district 
court in Builders Association barred any evidence "offered to show that the 
city ordinance has a nonremedial justification."251 Nevertheless, in light of 
Grutter, the city's economic development argument raised some interesting 
possibilities. 
First, the district court dismissed any evidence the city offered to show that 
racial preferences provided an economic benefit to Chicago, because the 
"Supreme Court has not definitively addressed the issue of whether 
nonremedial benefits can justify racial and gender classifications."252 Grutter 
undercut that holding, however - recall one of Grutter's central innovations 
was its determination that a nonremedial justification could support the 
government's use of racial preferences.253 After Grutter, the question was no 
longer whether the Court would accept a nonremedial justification for the 
government's use of racial preferences; a majority of the Court held that it 
would. Instead, the question was whether the Court would accept a 
nonremedial justification in contexts outside of higher education. Presumably, 
the positive externalities described above would accrue to all city residents 
rather than solely to the minority beneficiaries of such a program. The broad-
based nature of the city's justification in Builders Association suggests at least 
some kinship with the extra-educational, "common good" orientation of the 
Court's compelling interest analysis in Grutter. 
Of course, one problem is that the positive economic externalities associated 
with the use of the racial preferences described above seem unrelated to the 
kinds of benefits associated with racial diversity that are outlined in Grutter. 
Consequently, the next question is whether it is possible to argue that the use 
of racial preferences in the public contracting area generates positive 
249 Fridkin, supra note 201 at 522. 
250 Id. at 522-23 . 
25 1 Builders Ass 'n, 2003 WL I 786489, at *7. 
252 Id. at *8. 
253 See supra Part I.A. 
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externalities similar to those observed in Grutter. The answer to this question 
is yes. To the extent the government's procurement policies distribute what is 
essentially a public benefit,254 the distribution of that public benefit must at 
least appear to be fair or the government risks erosion of public confidence in 
the governmental contracting entity more generally.255 Thus, if public 
contracting opportunities are devoid of minority participation, this sends the 
message that public programs are not open to all. From an institutional 
perspective, this undercuts the community's faith in, and belief in the fairness 
and legitimacy of, government as government. 256 This concern dovetails with 
the Court' s emphasis in Grutter on institutional legitimacy such that "[a]ll 
members of our heterogeneous society must have confidence in the openness 
and integrity of the educational institutions that provide this training."257 
Another concern is the arguable dissimilarity between the selection 
mechanisms employed by the government in the higher education and public 
contracting contexts. The selective admissions process as described by Grutter 
is multidimensional and multifaceted. Selective institutions want not just well-
qualified students, but also a diverse class along a wide variety of dimensions: 
geographic, experiential, racial and ethnic. On the other hand, the selection 
process in the public contracting context is one-dimensional since the 
government's ultimate aim should be singular: awarding the contract to the 
lowest qualified bidder.258 Thus, one argument is that the relaxed scrutiny 
associated with the government's use of racial preferences in the higher 
education context vis-a-vis Grutter is inapplicable to the government's use of 
racial preferences in the public contracting context. 
One response to this line of reasoning is that the competitive bidding 
selection process is often more multifaceted than it first appears. For instance, 
many municipalities may only contract with the lowest "responsible" bidder, 
who is not necessarily the lowest cost provider.259 Instead, where such a 
254 See Thomas W. Merrill , Public Contracts, Private Contracts, and the Transformation 
of the Constitutional Order, 37 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 597, 626-27 (1987) (arguing in the 
context of the Contracts Clause that "public contracts, no less than welfare benefits or 
antidiscrimination laws, are viewed as public entitlements entitled to special judicial 
protection"). 
255 Gene Ming Lee, Note, A Case for Fairness in Public Works Contracting, 65 
FORDHAM L. REv. 1075, 1093 ( 1996) ("An important aim in the government 's procurement 
of goods and services is the appearance of fairness."). 
256 As Fridkin aptly suggests, "[i]f the firms engaged in urban construction projects are 
principally white-owned, there may be similar risks to the perceived legitimacy of the public 
leaders selecting these firms if the firms are performing work in, and receiving taxpayer 
dollars from, communities of color." Fridkin, supra note 201 , at 524. 
257 Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 332 (2003). 
258 See Steven R. Schooley & Michael W. Andrew, Jr. , The Devil in Devolution: State 
and Local Preference Programs, CONSTRUCTRION LAW. , Oct. I 996, at 18, 18. 
259 See John K. Gisleson, Competitive Bidding of Municipal Contracts in Pennsylvania 
and the Litigation it Generates: Who is the Lowest Responsible Bidder?, 41 DUQ. L. REV. 
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requirement applies, the municipality has discretion to select a higher bidder 
where the lower bidder is not sufficiently responsible.260 The municipality 
may consider a number of factors in making this determination, including 
"financial responsibility, also integrity, efficiency, industry, experience, 
promptness, and ability to successfully carry out the particular undertaking."261 
The theory behind the responsible bidder requirement is that the expenditure of 
public money must be for the "public good."262 Indeed, some scholars have 
suggested that the use of procurement policies to achieve social agendas 
restricts "logical market policy."263 These observations suggest a more 
multidimensional public contracting process that conceivably could be 
analogized to the admissions process for selective colleges and universities. 
Next, even if one rejects the argument that Grutter overturned Croson and 
Adarand sub silentio, there is still little question that Grutter was in tension 
with those cases. For example, consider the narrow tailoring requirement. 
Even if the government has to meet the more stringent remedial standard by 
demonstrating a compelling interest for its use of racial preferences in the 
public contracting context, Grutter's relaxed approach could be applied to the 
narrow tailoring inquiry. This argument boils down to the question of whether 
Grutter's emphasis on "good faith" rather than skepticism might define the 
narrow tailoring inquiry in the public contracting context. Prior to Parents 
Involved, some lower federal courts evaluating the constitutionality of racial 
preferences in the public contracting area cited Grutter either for the 
proposition that narrow tailoring factors associated with higher education apply 
outside of that context, or to highlight the importance of governmental "good 
faith."264 While the application of some elements of Grutter's deferential 
narrow tailoring approach did not necessarily change the outcome in those 
cases, Grutter's more deferential approach clearly informed those courts' 
analyses. 
For instance, two lower court cases applied Grutter's approach to the 
consideration of race-neutral alternatives on the narrow tailoring inquiry. 
Sherbrooke Turf, Inc. v. Minnesota Department of Transportation concerned a 
Department of Transportation Disadvantaged Business Enterprises ("DBE") 
program that provides "contracting advantages to small businesses owned and 
513,521 (2003). 
260 Id. at 529. 
261 Id. 
262 Id. at 530. 
263 Schooley & Andrew, supra note 258, at 18. 
264 See W. States Paving Co. v. Wash. State Dep't ofTransp., 407 F.3d 983, 994 (9th Cir. 
2005) (highlighting the importance of governmental good faith); Sherbrooke Turf, Inc. v. 
Minn. Dep't of Transp., 345 F.3d 964, 969 (8th Cir. 2003) (finding the government had a 
compelling interest in "not perpetuating the effects of racial discrimination in its own 
distribution of federal funds"). 
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controlled by 'socially and economically disadvantaged individuals. '"265 In 
order to determine contractor eligibility, states accepting funds under the 
program "must employ a rebuttable presumption that women and members of 
most racial minority groups are socially and economically disadvantaged."266 
Two non-minority contractors sued alleging that the program violated the 
equal protection component of the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause.267 
The Eighth Circuit ruled the government has a compelling interest in "not 
perpetuating the effects of racial discrimination in its own distribution of 
federal funds. "268 
The Eighth Circuit's narrow tailoring analysis reflected the impact of 
Grutter's deferential approach to strict scrutiny review. On the one hand, the 
court cited Adarand for the proposition that the Department of Transportation 
("DOT") regulations implementing the DBE program satisfied narrow tailoring 
because they strongly emphasized race-neutral means to enhance minority 
participation in government contracting.269 But in the very next sentence, the 
court cited Grutter for the proposition that '"[n]arrow tailoring does not require 
exhaustion of every conceivable race-neutral alternative,' but it does require 
'serious, good-faith consideration of workable race-neutral alternatives. "'270 
Along these lines, consider as well Western States Paving Co. v. Washington 
State Department of Transportation,271 in which the Ninth Circuit considered 
the constitutionality of the same DOT program that was at issue in Sherbrooke 
Turf The court's discussion of race-neutral alternatives in Western States 
essentially tracks that of Sherbrooke Turf, citing the exact same Grutter "good 
faith" language the Sherbrooke Turf court had relied upon. 272 
265 Sherbrooke Turf, 345 F.3d at 968 (quoting the DBE program). The program was 
authorized under the Transportation Equity Act for the 21st Century, Pub. L. No. I 05-178, 
§ I I0l(b)(l), 112 Stat. 107, 113 (1998). Sherbrooke Turf, 345 F.3d at 968-69. 
266 Sherbrooke Turf, 345 F.3d at 968. 
267 Id. at 967-69. 
268 Id. at 969. 
269 Id. at 972. 
270 Id. (emphasis added). According to the court, this requirement was met for three 
principal reasons. First, "[t]he state must meet the 'maximum feasible portion ' of its overall 
goal through race-neutral means and must submit for approval a projection of the portion [ of 
the overall DBE goal] it expects to meet through race-neutral means." Id. at 971. Second, 
under the program, while set-aside contracts are permitted, they are " limited to those 
instances 'when no other method could be reasonably expected to redress egregious 
instances of discrimination."' Id. (citing 49 C.F.R. § 26.43(b) (2007)). Finally, if a state 
meets its overall DBE goal "for two consecutive years through race-neutral means, [the 
state] is not required to set an annual overall [DBE] goal until it does not meet its prior 
overall goal for a year." Id. at 972. 
271 407 F.3d 983 (9th Cir. 2005). 
272 Id. at 993 (quoting Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 339 (2003)). Accord N. 
Contracting, Inc. v. Illinois, No. 00-4515, 2005 WL 2230195, at *24 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 8, 
2005), ajf'd, 473 F.3d 715 (7th Cir. 2007). Western States ruled the program was narrowly 
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The application of Grutter "good faith" in this context would seem to be in 
tension with the treatment of race-neutral alternatives in Croson. In Croson, 
the Court seemed to indicate that all feasible race-neutral alternatives must be 
considered and rejected prior to resorting to race-conscious means. The tenor 
of the Croson Court's discussion suggested that implementation of race-neutral 
means would have obviated the need for the set-aside program.273 As Ian 
Ayres has observed, "Croson requires policymakers to find that race-neutral 
means could not achieve the government's compelling interest."274 This 
approach to the narrow tailoring inquiry reflects a deep suspicion of race-
conscious mechanisms such that race-neutral alternatives are entirely 
acceptable even if less effective at achieving the government's compelling 
interest. 
Grutter suggested otherwise. In Grutter, the Court stated that, at least in 
higher education, "[n]arrow tailoring does not require exhaustion of every 
conceivable race-neutral alternative."275 Thus, narrow tailoring requires 
consideration rather than exhaustion of "workable race-neutral alternatives."276 
Consideration of race-neutral alternatives does not require universities to 
"choose between maintaining a reputation for excellence or fulfilling a 
commitment to provide educational opportunities to ... all groups."277 In the 
remedial context, on the other hand, courts "should give particularly intense 
scrutiny to whether a nonracial approach . . . could promote the substantial 
interest about as well and at tolerable administrative expense."278 With 
Grutter's view of narrow tailoring, the government's consideration of race-
neutral alternatives to achieve its ends merely substantiates its good faith; 
exhaustion of such alternatives is not required because the government's good 
faith is presumed rather than doubted. The difference in treatment of the 
question of whether race-neutral alternatives must be exhausted rather than 
simply considered is yet another indication of the different brand of strict 
scrutiny review that the Court applied in Grutter. 
That is not to suggest that reference to the Grutter approach to race-neutral 
alternatives was necessarily outcome determinative in those cases. There is 
evidence to suggest the DOT program at issue in Sherbrooke Turf and Western 
tailored because, inter alia, the "regulations place a preference on the use of race-neutral 
means . . . to achieve a State's DBE utilization goal." W. States, 407 F.3d at 993 (citing 
Sherbrooke Turf, 345 F.3d at 972). 
273 Along these lines, the Court stated that "there does not appear to have been any 
consideration of the use of race-neutral means to increase minority business participation in 
city contracting." Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 507 (1989); accord Adarand 
Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 237-38 (1995). 
274 Ian Ayres, Narrow Tailoring, 43 UCLA L. REv. 1781, 1787 (1996). 
275 Grutter, 539 U.S. at 339. 
276 Id. 
277 Id. 
278 Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267,280 n.6 (1986). 
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States could have met the requirements of narrow tailoring as articulated in 
Croson and Adarand.279 Instead, the migration of Grutter's approach to 
narrow tailoring in the contracting context demonstrates Grutter's potential to 
unsettle the "remedial" category. In Western States, not only did the Ninth 
Circuit cite the same Grutter language as Sherbrooke Turf in the context of its 
discussion of race-neutral alternatives, but it also referenced Grutter in its 
discussion of the distinction between a quota and a goal. 28° Citing Grutter for 
the proposition that "a permissible goal . . . requires only a good-faith 
effort ... to come within a range demarcated by the goal itself,"281 the court 
went on to rule that the DOT program "provides for a flexible system of 
contracting goals that contrasts sharply with the rigid quotas invalidated in 
Croson."282 The emphasis on good faith and flexibility suggests a more 
relaxed approach to the narrow tailoring analysis than Croson and Adarand. 
III. PARENTS INVOLVED IN COMMUNITY SCHOOLS V. SEATTLE SCHOOL DISTRICT 
No. I 
In Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. 
1,283 the Supreme Court ruled that both the Seattle School District and the 
279 In a case decided prior to Grutter, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled the DOT 
program was narrowly tailored because, inter alia, it "emphasize[ d] the continuing need to 
employ non-race-conscious methods even as the need for race-conscious remedies is 
recognized." Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Slater, 228 F.3d 1147, 1179 (10th Cir. 2000), 
cert. dismissed, 534 U.S. 103 (2001 ). Adarand seems to suggest that the references to 
Grutter in Sherbrooke Turf and Western States were not necessary to the result. The Tenth 
Circuit opinion was not the end of the litigation, however. Adarand petitioned the United 
States Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari and that petition was subsequently granted. 
Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Mineta, 532 U.S. 941 (2001) (granting certiorari). 
Petitioner's brief on the merits argued that the Tenth Circuit had misapplied the controlling 
standard: "a 'race conscious remedy will not be narrowly tailored until less sweeping 
alternatives - particularly race-neutral ones - have been considered and tried.'" Petition for 
Writ ofCertorari, Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Mineta, 534 U.S. 103 (2001) (No. 00-730) 
(quoting Walker v. City of Mesquite, 169 F.3d 973,983 (5th Cir. 1999)). Petitioner argued 
that an "array" of race-neutral solutions were available but not tried. Id. For instance, 
petitioner asserted Congress did not attempt to waive a bonding requirement for 
inexperienced firms before requiring the DOT to presume that every single Sri Lankan 
permanently residing in America has tried to enter the American highway construction 
business. Id. Consequently, there is some dispute as to whether the DOT program would 
have survived constitutional review under an exhaustion-based standard. The Supreme 
Court did not reach the merits of the argument, and subsequently dismissed the writ as 
improvidently granted. Adarand, 534 U.S. at 103 (dismissing certiorari as improvidently 
granted). 
280 W. States Paving Co. v. Wash. State Dep't ofTransp., 407 F.3d 983, 993-94 (9th Cir. 
2005). 
281 Id. at 994 (citing Grutter, 539 U.S. at 335). 
2s2 Id. 
283 127 S. Ct. 2738 (2007). 
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Jefferson County School District 's voluntary desegregation plans violated the 
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.284 Writing for the 
majority, Chief Justice Roberts ruled that neither the Seattle nor Jefferson 
County plans were narrowly tailored because "other means would be 
effective."285 Therefore, the two plans flunked the strict scrutiny test. 
However, Chief Justice Roberts' opinion did not receive five votes across the 
board. Five Justices (Roberts, Scalia, Thomas, Alito, and Kennedy) joined 
both the reasoning and the result in Parts I-A, 1-B, II, III-A and III-C of the 
Chief Justice's opinion for the Court.286 Consequently, those portions of the 
Court's opinion have the force of a majority ruling (hereinafter "the 
majority"). 287 Four Justices (Roberts, Scalia, Thomas, and Alito) joined the 
reasoning and the result in Parts III-B and IV of the Chief Justice's opinion, 
(hereinafter "the plurality").288 Justice Kennedy wrote an opinion concurring 
in part and concurring in the judgment.289 Finally, Justice Breyer wrote the 
main dissent, which three other Justices joined (Ginsberg, Souter, and 
Stevens). 290 
Justice Kennedy 's concurring optmon adds an additional layer of 
complexity. His concurrence explains why he joined Parts III-A and III-C, 
which allowed the Court to strike down the voluntary desegregation plans.291 
But Justice Kennedy's concurrence also discussed his refusal to join the 
remainder of the Chief Justice 's opinion: "parts of the opinion by the Chief 
Justice imply an all-too-unyielding insistence that race cannot be a factor in 
instances when, in my view, it may be taken into account."292 And taken 
together with Justice Breyer's dissent, Justice Kennedy's concurrence 
establishes a five-vote majority for the proposition that school districts have a 
"compelling interest to achieve a diverse student population."293 Thus, while 
Justice Kennedy's rationale for joining Parts III-A and Ill-C of the Court's 
opinion - which he signed in full - is technically dicta, a thorough analysis of 
284 Id. at 2746. The mechanics of each plan are discussed above in Part II.A. 
285 Id. at 2759 ("The minimal effect these classifications have on student assignments ... 
suggests that other means would be effective."). 
286 Id. at 2746. 
287 In Part I-A, Chief Justice Roberts provided the general factual background and 
procedural history of the Seattle case. Id. at 2746-49. In Part I-B, Chief Justice Roberts 
provided the general factual background and procedural history of the Louisville case. Id. at 
2749-50. In Part II , the Court ruled it had jurisdiction to decide the cases before it. Id. at 
2750-51. 
288 Id. at 2755, 2761 (Roberts, C.J., plurality opinion). 
289 Id. at 2788 (Kennedy, J. , concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). 
290 Id. at 2800 (Breyer, J., dissenting). Justice Thomas also wrote a concurring opinion, 
id. at 2768 (Thomas, J. , concurring), and Justice Stevens filed a separate dissent, id. at 2797 
(Stevens, J. , dissenting). 
29 1 Id. at 2793 (Kennedy, J. , concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). 
292 Id. at 2791. 
293 Id. at 2797. 
2008] STIFLING THE POTENTIAL OF GRUTTER V. BOLLINGER 979 
his concurrence is crucial to any understanding of Parents Involved. Although 
Justice Kennedy spoke only for himself, his views must be given great weight. 
A. The Majority: Narrowing Grutter to the Higher Education Context 
In this Section, I explore Parts III-A and III-C of Chief Justice Roberts' 
Parents Involved opinion, each of which garnered five votes. The majority's 
holding can be stated with relative ease: the student assignment plans were 
unconstitutional because they were not narrowly tailored.294 But to focus 
solely on the holding is to miss much of the majority opinion's import. While 
the majority never explicitly decided whether the student assignment plans 
lacked a compelling governmental interest, the Court's approach implied such 
a conclusion. And that implication - that the student assignment plans were 
not animated by a compelling interest - turned in large part on the majority's 
narrow interpretation of Grutter. 
In Part III-A, the only relevant question was whether the voluntary 
desegregation plans fit within one of the two previously approved 
"compelling" interests: remedying the effects of past intentional 
discrimination, and "student body diversity 'in the context of higher 
education. "'295 The Court held they did not. First, the majority ruled neither 
school district could rely on the remedial justification; Seattle had never been 
the subject of a "court-ordered desegregation decree," and a federal district 
court dissolved the Louisville desegregation order in 2000.296 
Second, the majority ruled Grutter could not support the student assignment 
plans.297 The Parents Involved majority narrowly defined the interest that 
Grutter found compelling as "student body diversity 'in the context of higher 
education. "'298 This definition suggested that the "student body diversity" 
compelling governmental interest operated solely within the higher education 
context and no other; thus, the majority's holding that the "present cases are 
not governed by Grutter. "299 Indeed, the Court admonished several federal 
appellate courts for misinterpreting Grutter by relying on it to uphold student 
assignment plans in the primary and secondary school context. The Court 
explained that those federal courts misunderstood Grutter because they failed 
to appreciate that Grutter was decided in the unique context of higher 
education: 
Prior to Grutter, the courts of appeals rejected as unconstitutional 
294 See id. at 2760 (majority opinion). 
295 Id. at 2753 (quoting Grutter v Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 328 (2003)). The majority (as 
distinct from the plurality) never considered the additional interests that supported 
Louisville and Seattle's voluntary desegregation plans. See id. at 2760. 
296 Id. at 2752. 
297 See id. at 2753 (suggesting that because race is the decisive factor in the assignment 
plans, it is distinct from Grutter where race was one of many factors) . 
298 Id. (quoting Grutter, 539 U.S. at 328). 
299 Id. at 2754. 
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attempts to implement race-based assignment plans - such as the plans at 
issue here - in primary and secondary schools. After Grutter, however, 
the two Courts of Appeals in these cases, and one other, found that race-
based assignments were permissible at the elementary and secondary 
level, largely in reliance on that case. In upholding the admissions plan in 
Grutter, though, this Court relied upon considerations unique to 
institutions of higher education .... 300 
That the majority so clearly situates Grutter within the higher education 
context suggests it is confining Grutter to that context alone. But this passage 
is illuminating for yet another reason. The Court's emphasis on the world 
before and after Grutter reflects a grudging recognition of just how much 
Grutter did change the legal landscape. Lower courts relied on Grutter' s more 
expansive vision of the governmental interest and its relaxed brand of narrow 
tailoring, and imported those innovations outside of the higher education 
context. The majority is deeply disapproving of that move. It is as if the Court 
is saying to government entities: you may not use Grutter to support your use 
of racial preferences, unless those preferences are employed in the higher 
education context. From this perspective, all governmental uses of race 
( outside the unique context of higher education) must be justified as a remedy 
for intentional discrimination. 
The Parents Involved majority described the interest Grutter found 
compelling in narrow, cursory terms. Indeed, the majority's most expansive 
definition of Grutter's "diversity interest" was that race should be "considered 
as part of a broader effort to achieve 'exposure to widely diverse people, 
cultures, ideas, and viewpoints. "'301 The majority opined, "[t]he entire gist of 
the analysis in Grutter was that the admissions program at issue there focused 
on each applicant as an individual, and not simply as a member of a particular 
racial group."302 Next, the Court characterized the selection mechanism 
approved in Grutter as flexible and multifaceted. The Court emphasized that 
Grutter upheld the Law School's admissions policy because race was just one 
factor among many determining admission. 303 In contrast, the Court 
characterized the student assignment plans at issue as monolithic: "under each 
plan when race comes into play, it is decisive by itself."304 The majority's 
difficulty with the student assignment plans was that they improperly 
emphasized race at the expense of individual students' unique characteristics. 
The problem with the majority's approach in Part III-A was that it lacked 
any discussion of why Grutter ruled that racial diversity was so important in 
the higher education setting or any explanation of the exogenous benefits 
Grutter associated with racial diversity. To be sure, an important part of 
300 Id. 
301 Id. at 2753 (quoting Grutter, 539 U.S. at 330). 
302 Id. (emphasis added). 
303 Id. at 2753-54. 
304 Id. at 2753. 
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Grutter's analysis was the Court's discussion of the necessity of treating 
applicants as individuals. But that discussion was a key portion of the Court's 
narrow tailoring analysis. The entirety of Grutter cannot be reduced to the 
focus on "each applicant as an individual," because doing so ignores Grutter's 
discussion of the Law School's compelling interest. It ignores the myriad 
reasons why the Grutter Court believed it was important for the Law School to 
have a racially diverse class in the first place. Moreover, in Part III-A, it is 
difficult to tell the difference between the majority's discussion of Grutter's 
compelling governmental interest and narrow tailoring analyses; the Court 
conflates the two.305 But perhaps that is the majority's point: in confining 
Grutter to higher education, and only then to situations where colleges and 
universities treat each applicant for admission as an individual, the Court 
reduces Grutter to a mere restatement of the holding in Gratz. 
Finally, consider Part III-C of the majority's opinion, which explicitly 
concerned narrow tailoring. Part III-C departs from Grutter's deferential 
approach to the government's use of racial classifications. Grutter was 
unusual in that it required only that the government consider - rather than 
exhaust - race-neutral measures prior to instituting a race-conscious 
admissions policy.306 While it is true the Court cites Grutter to that effect,307 it 
also cites Justice Kennedy's concurring opinion in Croson for the proposition 
that "racial classifications [are] permitted only 'as a last resort."'308 Indeed, 
the majority's approach to narrow tailoring is more consistent with Justice 
Kennedy in Croson than Justice O'Connor in Grutter. 
In Part III-C, the Court ruled the school districts' student assignment plans 
were not narrowly tailored because the districts failed to show they 
"considered methods other than explicit racial classifications to achieve their 
stated goals."309 The majority's position regarding the districts' use ofrace in 
the student assignment plans was simply that "other means would be 
effective."310 But both the Sixth and Ninth Circuits ruled (with one small 
exception) that the Jefferson County and Seattle School Districts had 
considered alternative race-neutral measures in good faith and found them 
ineffective. 311 The majority simply disagreed with the lower courts, expressing 
305 See id. at 2753-54. 
306 See supra Part J.C. 
307 Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. at 2760 (citing Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 339 
(2003)). 
308 Id. at 2760-61 (citing Richmond v. J. A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 519 (1989) 
(Kennedy, J. , concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). 
309 Id. at 2760. 
310 Id. at 2759. 
311 Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. I, 426 F.3d 1162, 1191 (9th 
Cir. 2005) ("[T]he District made a good faith effort to consider feasible race-neutral 
alternatives and permissibly rejected them in favor of a system involving a sibling 
preference, a race-based tiebreaker and a proximity preference."), rev 'd 127 S. Ct. 2738 
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skepticism rather than deference towards the school districts' good faith. 312 
Indeed, the entire thrust of Part III-C is that the student assignment plans were 
not really necessary because they had only a "minimal effect on the assignment 
of students."313 This approach also suggested the school districts needed to 
exhaust rather than simply consider race-neutral alternatives. But in Gruffer, 
the Court deferred to the Law School both with respect to the importance of 
racial diversity to its mission and the means it could use to achieve that 
interest.314 The Parents Involved majority rejects this deferential approach. 
In sum, a majority of the Court in Parents Involved ruled that neither 
Gruffer nor doctrine recognizing a compelling interest in remedying the effects 
of past intentional discrimination supported the school districts' interest in 
promoting integration. In addition, the majority also ruled that the student 
assignment plans were not sufficiently narrowly tailored to survive strict 
scrutiny review. I have argued that one clear implication of the majority's 
approach is to limit Gruffer to the context of higher education. 
B. The Plurality: Rejecting the "Common Good" Approach 
In this Section, I explore the Parents Involved plurality, Parts III-B and IV 
of Chief Justice Roberts' opinion.315 Part III-B expresses real skepticism about 
the value of the benefits associated with racial diversity. And in Part IV, the 
plurality decisively rejected a "common good" interpretation of Grutter. 
In Part III-B, the plurality ruled the plans at issue were "not narrowly 
tailored to the goal of achieving the educational and social benefits asserted to 
flow from racial diversity."316 At first blush, Part III-B simply appears to 
anticipate the majority's holding in Part III-C, that the plans at issue were not 
narrowly tailored and therefore flunked strict scrutiny review. 317 Along these 
lines, the plurality ruled the school districts' plans failed the narrow tailoring 
test because they were "tied to each district's specific racial demographics, 
rather than to any pedagogic concept of the level of diversity needed to obtain 
(2007); McFarland v. Jefferson County Pub. Sch. , 330 F. Supp. 2d 834, 861 (W.D. Ky. 
2004) ("The Court concludes that, throughout most of the assignment process [excluding the 
traditional school assignment process which accounted for a small portion of the assignment 
plan], the Board sufficiently considered and used alternatives, which either were race-
neutral or made minimal use of race, to meet narrow tailoring requirements."), affd, 416 
F.3d 513 (6th Cir. 2005), rev'd, 127 S. Ct. 2738 (2007). 
312 Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. at 2760 ("[I]n Seattle several alternative assignment 
plans - many of which would not have used express racial classifications - were rejected 
with little or no consideration. Jefferson County has failed to present any evidence that it 
considered alternatives .... "). 
313 Id. 
314 See supra Part I.A. 
315 See supra note 288 and accompanying text. 
316 Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct at 2755 (Roberts, C.J., plurality opinion). 
317 Id. at 2755-59. 
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the asserted educational benefits,"318 and because the schools would have been 
substantially diverse even without the use of race in school assignrnents.319 
In reaching this conclusion, the plurality engaged in a lengthy exegesis into 
the relationship between each school district's racial demographics and the 
educational benefits purported to flow from such diversity. The plurality 
stated flatly that the "districts offer no evidence that the level of racial diversity 
necessary to achieve the asserted educational benefits happens to coincide with 
the racial demographics of the respective school districts."320 This discussion 
implied that the school districts' desire for racial diversity was "an end in 
itself."321 Indeed, much of Part III-B is concerned with rehashing the harms 
associated with racial balancing, and with explaining how attempts to re-label 
"racial balancing" as "racial diversity" or "racial integration" are unavailing 
d · · · 322 un er stnct scrutiny review. 
Thus, the thrust of Part III-B is that the "real motivation" behind the 
voluntary desegregation plans at issue was racial balance rather than the school 
districts' good faith desire to achieve the benefits associated with racial 
diversity. But what was the point of establishing the school districts' "real 
motivation"? First, this approach displayed the plurality's lack of deference to 
the school districts' objectives and the means used to achieve them, in sharp 
contrast to Grutter-style deference. Second, conflating the educational and 
broader social benefits associated with racial diversity with "racial balancing" 
discredits the entire enterprise. After all, if "racial balancing," "racial 
diversity," and "racial integration" are essentially synonymous then they are all 
invalid. 
This interpretation of Part III-B makes sense when one considers the 
plurality's interpretation of Grutter in Part IV. Part IV is an explicit rebuke to 
Justice Breyer's dissent, and in particular to Justice Breyer's interpretation of 
Grutter. The plurality took issue with Justice Breyer's assertion that "the 
existence of a compelling interest in these cases 'follows a fortiori' from 
Grutter."323 Justice Breyer argued the school districts' interest must be 
compelling because Grutter had already recognized the "civic effects" of a 
racially diverse education - enhanced cross-racial understanding, reduction in 
stereotypes, and increased ability for individuals to function in a global 
3 18 Id. at 2755. 
319 Id. at 2756-57. 
320 Id. at 2756. 
32 1 Id. It is certainly true that "racial balance is not to be achieved for its own sake." Id. 
at 2757. But the plurality's narrow tailoring analysis went beyond what would have been 
necessary to invalidate the plans. For instance, the plurality could simply have ruled that the 
plans failed the narrow tailoring test because there were other less restrictive, race-neutral 
alternatives that would have achieved the school districts' ends. 
322 See id. at 2758-59. 
323 Id. at 2763 . 
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marketplace - as compelling.324 Justice Breyer noted these civic effects of 
racial diversity applied even more forcefully to primary and secondary 
education "where each of us begins to absorb those values we carry with us to 
the end of our days .... '[U]nless our children begin to learn together, there is 
little hope that our people will ever learn to live together. "'325 Indeed, in 
describing the racial classifications at issue Justice Breyer opined: "They do 
not impose burdens unfairly upon members of one race alone but instead seek 
benefits for members of all races alike."326 In this manner, Justice Breyer was 
speaking of racial diversity from the perspective of the benefits that accrue to 
all - that is, racial diversity as a "common good." 
Now note the plurality's response. The plurality accused Justice Breyer of 
overreading Grutter by "suggesting that it renders pure racial balancing a 
constitutionally compelling interest. "327 But what is the basis for this 
assertion? In Part III-B, the plurality argued that "reliance on Grutter cannot 
sustain [the school districts'] plans,"328 and held that the plans' "design and 
operation" demonstrated they are "directed only to racial balance, pure and 
simple."329 From this perspective, it is possible to understand why the plurality 
accuses Justice Breyer of "overreading Grutter" - because his interpretation 
suggests that an institution that can deliver and inculcate the same types of 
social benefits associated with racial diversity that Grutter recognized has a 
compelling interest in using race to pursue those ends. In stark contrast, the 
plurality argued that any interpretation of Grutter that would allow courts to 
take the government's purpose for the racial classification into consideration 
on the strict scrutiny analysis is incorrect: "[ o ]ur cases clearly reject the 
argument that motives affect the strict scrutiny analysis. "330 Yet, as discussed 
above, one interpretation of Grutter is that it privileged one particular 
governmental interest: racial diversity in settings likely to promote positive 
social externalities. The plurality decisively rejected this interpretation. 
Parents Involved stifled Grutter's expansive potential. The majority was 
explicit in its attempt to cabin Grutter and confine it to the higher education 
context alone. In a complementary move, the plurality attacked Grutter head 
on, explicitly rejecting Justice Breyer's expansive interpretation of the case. 
For the plurality, the government's ends are immaterial: "different rules should 
[not] govern racial classifications designed to include rather than exclude."331 
324 Id. at 2822 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
325 Id. ( citations omitted). 
326 Id. at 2818 (emphasis added). 
327 Id. at 2763 (Roberts, C.J., plurality opinion). 
328 Id. at 2755. 
329 Id. 
330 Id. at 2764. 
331 Id. 
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C. Justice Kennedy Pushes Back 
While Parents Involved stifles Grutter's potential, it does not destroy it, 
largely because Justice Kennedy's concurrence moderated the impact of the 
majority and the plurality's cramped interpretation of Grutter. Justice 
Kennedy rejected the view that Grutter has no relevance whatsoever outside of 
the higher education context. Thus, Justice Kennedy' s concurring opinion 
departed from the plurality to the extent the plurality failed to "acknowledge 
that the school districts have identified a compelling interest here."332 And, 
Justice Kennedy's concurrence backtracked from the majority's holding that 
the "present cases are not governed by Grutter."333 Instead, Justice Kennedy 
allowed the compelling interest the Court recognized in Grutter along with the 
government's interest in remedying the effects of past intentional 
discrimination to "inform the present inquiry."334 Consequently, Justice 
Kennedy relied on Grutter to reach the conclusion that the public school 
districts had a compelling interest in obtaining racial diversity.335 
One question is whether the distinction between "inform" and "govern" 
matters. One response is that the difference is immaterial, particularly if one 
recalls that Justice Kennedy dissented in Grutter. 336 Perhaps Justice Kennedy 
did not wish to accord the Grutter majority an undue amount of influence 
given his dissent in that case. From this perspective, there is little meaningful 
distinction between "inform" and "govern." After all, Justice Kennedy 
ultimately concluded that "[d]iversity, depending on its meaning and 
definition, is a compelling educational goal a school district may pursue."337 
Indeed, there are five votes (inclusive of Justice Breyer and the other three 
dissenters) for this proposition.338 This holding is extremely important. 
Parents Involved is the first time that five members of the Court recognized 
that public school districts have a compelling interest in pursing racial diversity 
in the absence of a finding of de jure segregation. 
Because Grutter was a factor in Justice Kennedy's analysis, there is a strong 
argument that Grutter's expansive possibilities remain intact. Parents 
Involved neither overturned Grutter nor (thanks to Justice Kennedy) limited it 
to its facts . Moreover, Justice Kennedy described the school districts' interest 
in pursuing racial diversity broadly. School districts have an interest in 
"avoiding racial isolation" so that our nation can meet its "moral and ethical 
obligation to fulfill its historic commitment to creating an integrated 
332 Id. at 2789 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). 
333 See id. at 2754 (majority opinion). 
334 Id. at 2793 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). 
335 See id. at 2792. 
336 Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 387 (2003) (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
337 Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. at 2789 (Kennedy, J, concurring in part and concurring 
in the judgment). 
338 Id. at 2800 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
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society."339 At other points in his concurrence, Justice Kennedy suggests there 
is an inexorable link between Brown's promise of equal educational 
opportunity and racial diversity.340 
On the other hand, while it is true Justice Kennedy's concurrence saves 
Grutter from irrelevance and keeps its expansive possibilities intact, there is 
also a good argument that it narrows rather than expands Grutter's 
possibilities, at least in the short term. Recall Justice Kennedy's seemingly 
expansive statement that the compelling interest recognized in Grutter helps to 
"inform the present inquiry."341 This statement is in tension with Part III-A of 
the majority opinion, which Justice Kennedy signed in full. In that part, the 
Court ruled that the "present cases are not governed by Grutter."342 The 
majority's holding suggested the higher education context is somehow unique. 
Indeed, imagine a counterfactual situation: the Court had ruled Grutter 
"governed" in Parents Involved. Such a holding would suggest Grutter had 
broad applicability outside of the higher education context including public 
employment and, potentially, public contracting. But Parents Involved did not 
so hold. On this view, Grutter does not govern in Parents Involved because 
the case concerns the government's use of racial classifications in a different 
context: primary and secondary schools. Indeed, Justice Kennedy's 
concurrence reaffirmed that holding. Emphasizing his agreement with Part III-
A, Justice Kennedy stated, "the compelling interests implicated in the cases 
before us are distinct from the interests the Court has recognized in remedying 
the effects of past intentional discrimination and in increasing diversity in 
higher education. "343 
Moreover, it is unclear from Justice Kennedy's concurrence exactly how 
Grutter informed his conclusion that diversity is a compelling interest in the 
public school context. His concurrence provides no guidance to the 
government or to the courts as to how in the future Grutter might apply outside 
of the higher education context. The concurrence raises more questions than it 
answers. Why, exactly, does Grutter "inform the present inquiry"? Is it 
because the government's need for racial diversity is similar in both contexts? 
Is it because the positive social externalities generated by racial diversity in the 
two contexts are similar? Is it because both cases concern educational 
institutions? Or is it because public primary and secondary education is itself 
unique, providing government in that context alone a justification to use race to 
achieve diversity? Ultimately, Justice Kennedy did not answer these 
questions. 
There are hints in the concurrence that Justice Kennedy is deferring to the 
school districts on the issue of the importance of racial diversity to primary and 
339 Id. at 2797 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). 
340 Id. at 2791. 
341 Id. at 2793. 
342 Id. at 2754 (majority opinion). 
343 Id. at 2793 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). 
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secondary education. Such deference is consistent with the Court' s approach 
in Grutter. But the argument that Justice Kennedy is applying Grutter-style 
deference in a factually analogous situation is problematic. One possibility is 
that Justice Kennedy viewed the local public school context as unique, based 
upon the combination of the Court's prior recognition of diversity as a 
compelling interest in Grutter and "Brown's objective of equal educational 
opportunity."344 On this view, it was the uniqueness of the public school 
context which animated Justice Kennedy ' s compelling interest analysis. It 
may well be that, given our history, public education is unique. But even 
where the argument for deference is perhaps stronger than in any other context, 
Justice Kennedy would require more of public school districts on the strict 
scrutiny analysis than the Grutter Court required of colleges and universities 
seeking the same goal. 
Along these lines, the Grutter Court applied a highly deferential form of 
"strict scrutiny" to the law school's admissions program. 345 The Court also 
accepted perhaps the broadest possible justification for the Law School ' s use 
of race in the admissions program: racial integration that promotes the 
common good. 346 And finally, the Court also dispensed with any requirement 
that the Law School exhaust race-neutral measures prior to using race-
conscious means.347 But in his Parents Involved concurrence, Justice Kennedy 
does not defer to the school districts. In fact, he is clear in stating that the 
school districts may not use the most efficient means to achieve racial 
integration.348 Moreover, school districts must exhaust race-neutral measures 
before resorting to a selection system that "classif{ies] every student on the 
basis of race and . .. assign[s] each of them to schools based on that 
classification."349 These requirements are not the hallmarks of deference. 
Moreover, Justice Kennedy's discussion of how Grutter affects his analysis 
is internally contradictory. Late in the concurrence, Justice Kennedy states, 
inconsistently with earlier statements, that Grutter has no application to the 
instant case because of the difference in the student selection mechanisms 
exhibited in the two different contexts: "[i]f [primary and secondary school] 
students were considered for a whole range of their talents and school needs 
with race as just one consideration, Grutter would have some application. 
That, though, is not the case."350 Given this statement, it is again worth asking 
344 Id. at 279 1. 
345 See supra Part I.A. 
346 See supra Part 1.8. 
347 See supra Part I.C. 
348 See Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. at 2796 (Kennedy, J. , concurring in part and 
concurring in the judgment). 
349 Id. at 2797. While Justice Kennedy would accept the type of "race as factor" 
selection mechanism approved in Grutter, the fact that such a system may not be feasible in 
the public school context is immaterial. See id. 
350 Id. at 2794. 
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just how Grutter "inform[s] the present inquiry." 
Initially, Justice Kennedy indicated that Grutter "informed" at the 
compelling interest step of strict scrutiny review: "these compelling interests, 
[diversity in higher education and remedying past intentional discrimination,] 
in my view, do help to inform the present inquiry."351 But perhaps Grutter 
"informs" in yet another way. That is, Grutter "informs the present inquiry" 
such that when government promotes diversity, it must do so in just the right 
way. That is, race must be just one factor in the overall selection mechanism 
which respects the individual as unique throughout the process. This 
interpretation of Justice Kennedy' s approach is consistent with Part III-C of the 
Court's opinion, and other portions of his concurrence that emphasize public 
school districts may use a variety of facially race-neutral means to achieve 
racial diversity (a race-conscious end) without triggering strict scrutiny review. 
Justice Kennedy opined: 
School boards may pursue the goal of bringing together students of 
diverse backgrounds and races through other means, including strategic 
site selection of new schools; drawing attendance zones with general 
recognition of the demographics of neighborhoods; allocating resources 
for special programs; recruiting students and faculty in a targeted fashion; 
and tracking enrollments, performance, and other statistics by race. 
These mechanisms are race conscious but do not lead to different 
treatment based on a classification that tells each student he or she is to be 
defined by race, so it is unlikely any of them would demand strict 
scrutiny to be found permissible.352 
The difficulty is that it is unclear to what extent Justice Kennedy's approach 
will actually assist school districts in "the important work of bringing together 
students of different racial, ethnic, and economic backgrounds."353 The trouble 
with Justice Kennedy's list of facially race-neutral, yet race-consciously 
motivated mechanisms is that there are serious questions as to their 
effectiveness. As Justice Breyer argued in dissent, "[n]othing in the extensive 
history of desegregation efforts over the past 50 years gives the districts, or this 
Court, any reason to believe that another method is possible to accomplish 
these goals."354 
35 1 Id. at 2793. 
352 Id. at 2792. 
353 Id. at 2797. 
354 Id. at 2828 (Breyer, J., dissenting). Justice Breyer argued that each of Justice 
Kennedy' s suggested race-neutral mechanisms was ineffective: 
But, as to "strategic site selection," Seattle has built one new high school in the last 44 
years (and that specialized school serves only 300 students). In fact, six of the Seattle 
high schools involved in this case were built by the 1920's; the other four were open by 
the early 1960's. As to "drawing" neighborhood "attendance zones" on a racial basis, 
Louisville tried it, and it worked only when forced busing was also part of the plan. As 
to "allocating resources for special programs," Seattle and Louisville have both 
experimented with this; indeed, these programs are often referred to as "magnet 
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In addition, Justice Kennedy may overstate the claim that these facially-
neutral, yet racially-motivated mechanisms are constitutionally unproblematic. 
After all, if the government takes these steps "because of race," and they have 
a disproportionate impact on students in some racial groups, then school 
districts that adopt Justice Kennedy's suggestions are still potentially open to 
constitutional challenge.355 Finally, under Justice Kennedy's approach, school 
districts are prohibited from classifying individual students on the basis of race 
unless race is just one factor and "other demographic factors, plus special 
talents and needs, [are] also . . . considered. "356 But this is a difficult 
proposition in the primary and secondary school context, where students are 
not competing against each other for admission based upon unique talents and 
gifts. 
Finally, Justice Kennedy also explicitly departed from Justice Breyer's 
dissent that offered an expansive vision of Grutter. For Justice Kennedy, 
Justice Breyer's reading of precedent (which centered on Grutter) had two 
major problems: it would allow the government to use racial classifications 
outside the school context and it authorized "permissive strict scrutiny (which 
bears more than a passing resemblance to rational-basis review)."357 Not only 
would Justice Breyer's interpretation of Grutter have supported the school 
districts' use of race in the student assignment plans challenged in Parents 
Involved, but it arguably would also support governmental use of race in other 
contexts such as public employment and perhaps even public contracting. 
Under this view of Grutter, the fact that the government is using racial 
preferences in a way that benefits society more generally rather than just a 
narrow sub-class of minority beneficiaries is a mitigating factor. One 
possibility is that Justice Kennedy rejects the "common good" view of Grutter 
altogether; on the other hand, there is the specter of Grutter clearly 
"inform[ing]" Justice Kennedy's analysis. 
schools," but the limited desegregation effect of these efforts extends at most to those 
few schools to which additional resources are granted. In addition, there is no evidence 
from the experience of these school districts that it will make any meaningful impact. 
As to "recruiting faculty" on the basis of race, both cities have tried, but only as one 
part of a broader program. As to "tracking enrollments, performance and other 
statistics by race," tracking reveals the problem; it does not cure it. 
Id. (citations omitted). 
355 See Pers. Adm'r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 272 (I 979) (finding that if the 
statute is a pretext for gender discrimination then it would be a violation of the Equal 
Protection Clause); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 240 (1976) (holding that a race-
neutral law could violate the Equal Protection Clause if its impact could be traced to a 
purpose of discriminating on the basis of race). 
356 Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. at 2797 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring 
in the judgment). 
357 Id. at 2793. 
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CONCLUSION 
Grutter was a remarkable moment for affirmative action jurisprudence as 
the Court truly recognized the importance of diversity to American society. 
Because Grutter concerned higher education, it was relatively easy - although 
no less remarkable - for the Court to make the link between the importance of 
diversity to the educational experience and the benefits of diversity to society 
more generally. Grutter left open a potentially transformative question: 
whether Grutter's rationale could apply in contexts beyond higher education. 
If so, there were exciting possibilities for proponents of affirmative action. 
Post-Grutter, lower courts began to explore these tantalizing possibilities. In 
contexts such as education, public employment, and public contracting, there 
were suddenly possibilities available to government actors trying to justify 
voluntary affirmative action programs. Then, in Parents Involved, the 
Supreme Court stifled these possibilities. Grutter's potential was not entirely 
destroyed, however, because Justice Kennedy's concurring opinion moderated 
the majority and plurality opinions. Because of Justice Kennedy, Grutter's 
transformative potential has been maintained, and now waits for the day that a 
more sympathetic Court might recognize it. 
Moreover, it is also important not to give up on Justice Kennedy in the short 
term. Justice Kennedy might be receptive to an argument that takes Grutter 
beyond higher education, at least with respect to the compelling interest 
analysis. After all, Justice Kennedy's compelling interest analysis was rooted 
both in his recognition of the public schools' ability "to teach that our strength 
comes from people of different races, creeds, and cultures uniting in 
commitment to the freedom of all,"358 and the Court's prior affirmation in 
Grutter that diversity in higher education is a compelling interest. Both the 
public schools and colleges and universities share a strong ability to instill and 
disperse the social benefits of racial diversity. Assuming public schools are 
not sui generis, Justice Kennedy might be persuaded to extend Grutter's 
compelling interest analysis to a similarly-situated public entity, such as the 
U.S. military, that is uniquely well-positioned to provide, disperse, and 
inculcate the social democracy-enhancing benefits of diversity in the widest 
possible manner. But Justice Kennedy's openness is likely to extend only so 
far; such an entity's use of race would also have to meet significant narrow 
tailoring constraints such as the requirement of individualized determinations. 
358 Id. at 2788. 
